Thursday 2 October 2008

Halachic Query: Conjoined Twins

Recently, someone watching The Learning Channel in the United States called me to ask for my opinion on the theoretical halachic consequences that could emerge in regard to the story that they were watching. It seems that the program was about conjoined twins who are only distinguishable from the neck up. In other words, while there were two heads, the rest of the body was shared between them. In regard to marriage and other matters of personal law, what would be the halachic status of such a person or persons if Jewish?

I was able to find clips about these two girls, Abby and Brittany, on YouTube, at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFs8TnUX9Fs, as I wanted to see for myself the exact nature of this case. It seems that medically the matter is quite complicated. There are clearly two personalities with two heads sharing what would seem to be one body. Doctors have found, though, that there are also two hearts, two sets of lungs, two stomachs but somehow everything merges so from the colon, there is only one. It would seem to be that there are similar distinctions in the limbs in that each girl controls only one arm but somehow the legs come under one neurological system. One of the clips indicate that the girls are now 16 and are talking about their desires to be mothers. Thus the question: if the girls were Jewish, could they marry? What would Noachide Law say for non-Jews?

There would seem to be some literature on the subject of Siamese twins in general in regard to marriage. In these cases, though, the bodies are much more distinct and, as in the case of the original Siamese twins who married two different women, each one of the twins would have separate relations with their spouses. The basic question would thus be more one of tznuit in that relations would have to happen in the presence of another person, namely the attached other twin. In the case of Abby and Brittany, though, the sexual organs are shared. Could they, thus, marry two different men? The fact is that even marrying one man could be a problem in that a man cannot have relations with his wife's sister. Would this not be similar to the case of a chatzi shifcha chatzi bat chorin with a combined status of being both Abby and Brittany applying to their combined being. The result would thus be that any sexual act would be defined as incest, according to the Halacha, since they are two sisters and the act would thus inherently be defined as having relations with your wife's sister (at the same time as having relations with your wife).

There is a case in T.B. Menachot 37a,b that actually deals with a case of a two-headed boy in regard to the question of pidyon haben, redeeming the first born. The gemara also raises the question as to how the mitzvah of tephillin for the head would be performed. It is unclear if the gemara views such a two-headed person as one person or two. Abby and Brittany are clearly two distinct personalities but the fundamental halachic question must be whether they are seen by Halacha as two distinct beings or one person. The gemara's discussion does not necessarily answer that question. The gemara also seems to imply that such a two-headed person is not really viable and would die soon after birth (not necessarily within 30 days, though). Abby and Brittany clearly do not fit into the gemara's profile and, thus, it may be argued that the gemara's presentation does not apply to them. There are further indications that these two girls are more separate beings than the being described in the gemara given the duality of many of their internal organs. The gemara seems to be indicating that this two-headed person under discussion only has two heads with everything else similar to the case of one individual. Yet, knowledge of whether the boy under discussion in the gemara had two hearts would not really be available to the authors of the gemara.

I thought that, if Abby and Brittany are defined as two persons by Halacha, one possible, halachically permitted way they may be able to have children, if they were Jewish, would be through the application of the law of pilegesh, concubine. There are major commentators, including the Ramo, who permit a pilegesh and I do not believe that the sister of one's pilegesh is forbidden to the man. Thus if this extenuating circumstance came up under Jewish Law there may be a way to let these girls become mothers. But maybe we would still not follow this route as it does challenge some basic general views on marriage. The fundamental question still remains: what is the definition of an independent being?

I don't really have answers to these questions. I am just posing this case as a halachic query for you to think about and comment.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

3 comments:

Anonymous said...

Unrelated to this post--

I read the Insight on the topic of Bracha, linked under Yom Kippur on the Nishma website, and it raised a question that has bothered me for years, but I did not feel that it sufficiently answered it.

How does one understand brachot (as bestowed by people on other people) in a non-mystical sense? Is there a way to do so? Tephila is more easily understood from this perspective: a recognition of God's greatness and our reliance on Him for our needs makes us into more worthy people, thereby hopefully altering God's judgment. But how does this work in terms of brachot? I can sort of see how Bircat Cohanim could affect those participating in it and therefore change the facts, although even that feels like a bit of a stretch--how does asking God to turn a favourable countenance toward us change us and make us more deserving? And even more troublesome is the practice of more casual bestowing of blessings, by a Rebbe, a chassan/kallah, a friend on his/her Hebrew birthday. How can these practices be understood?

Nishma said...

You ask a very good quesiton. Even from the mystical perspective, why should someone's good wishes change the way that God relates to you? The answer may be found in the concept of the collective. The fact that I acknowledge the other, the fact that I wish another to find favour in the eyes of God, that fact that I wish to be so remembered by another forges the connections between people and that has an importance in the development of the ideal. The goal is not solely my personal fulfillment but the fulfillment of all.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Anonymous said...

Thank you; I very much appreciate the explanation. I like the idea--and I will continue to ponder it.