Bernie Madoff's Jewishness

I just watched the Wall Street Journal's internet videos on Bernie Madoff. The whole issue is absolutely bewildering. How could he have pulled this off? How much pain did he cause? While watching, though, something else began to bother me. Actually, I was bothered about this before but the issue seemed to crystallize as I was watching these videos. What does this whole episode say about Jewishness is our time?

Let me explain what I mean. If I told you that I hated fishing but all my friends fished, in fact that's all they ever talked about, you would wonder what happened when I was with my friends. Who we associate with tells us about ourselves. So here is Bernie Madoff, heavily involved in the Jewish community -- how did that work? Was his Jewishness also feigned, something he use to secure easy "clients" for his scheme? Of course, people wonder how he could have done this to friends, to people he knew. But my question is about not only his Jewishness but Jewishness generally in our time. How could a conman feel comfortable within a Jewish community? Was that simply part of the con? Or is it actually possible for a conman to be a "proud Jew", wishing to interact with and within the Jewish community? What does that say about our present Jewish community? Shouldn't a conman not feel comfortable with fellow Jews who stand for values that are the opposite of a conman? I have a feeling that while a thief may like to steal from the Chafetz Chaim -- after all this great tzaddik would be full of rachamim and perhaps, sadly, an easy mark for a con -- this thief would find it very difficult to actually spend time with the Chafetz Chaim for the righteousness that would surround the Chafetz Chaim would drive a thief crazy; he simply couldn't take the ethical atmosphere. So did Bernie Madoff hang out with Jews because they were easy marks, he had an in with them, even though he couldn't stand all the honesty and goodness? Or did he not get this type of feeling when associating with Jews so there was nothing to bother him? And what does this say about the Jewish community? Or is there another perspective that we must attempt to understand in order to explain why someone wishes to hang out with a community that challenges his very intent? Maybe a human being is full of complexity? After all, that butcher who sold non-kosher meat as kosher had a family that was frum -- how could he maintain such a personal facade?

Rabbi Ben Hecht

12. The Phylactery of the Head

Wake up. Wash your hands. Get dressed. Put on your teffilin.

Slip on your shoes and your coat. Get the car keys. Drive to shul.

After prayers, leave your teffilin on.

Sit and learn until you have to leave. Then get back in your car and drive to work. When you get there, make yourself a coffee and toast a bagel. You’ve never eaten anything while wearing teffilin. Call your rabbi, make sure it’s okay.

Wash for the bagel. You decide not to bother your rabbi with this one: you undo your hand teffilin and do it back up once you’ve dried your hands.

When you go to the bathroom, leave your teffilin outside. When you put them back on afterwards, do you say a bracha? Probably not, you think. Call your rabbi to be sure.

Sit at your desk. You’re having a hard time concentrating. Your head teffilin are starting to give you a headache. You’ve been wearing them for almost three hours. Not to mention, your hand teffilin make it very difficult to type.

A temp spills orange juice on your new suit. You almost swear under your breath, but you bump your hand teffilin against your desk as you turn around. You figure you’re not supposed to swear with teffilin on.

You feel the need to sneeze but can’t remember if you’re allowed to sneeze while phylacteried (phylacterized?). You call your rabbi.

You have a meeting with a female coworker. You find her attractive. You call your rabbi to see if your teffilin prohibit you from attending the meeting but you get his voicemail. You decide to go through with the meeting, taking special care to stay focused.

On your lunch break, you take your regular walk around the park. You sit down on a bench and watch the clouds. You feel yourself falling asleep. You force yourself awake. Can you sleep with teffilin on?

You return to your office. Someone is eating fish and the smell bothers you. Do you have to go somewhere else? You vaguely remember reading something once about bothersome scents and teffilin (you call it the ‘Olfactory-Phylactery Connection’).

You call your rabbi. And you call him several more times throughout the rest of the day:

It’s raining when you leave work—can you get the teffilin wet?

In the car, you put the radio on—can you listen to music? Are kol isha laws more stringent with teffilin on?

Later, you wonder if television poses additional problems. “Rabbi, can I watch television with my teffilin on?” “I never said you could watch television without your teffilin on.” (You regret this phone call.)

You get to shul in time for mincha. After mincha, you go home. You hang the car keys on the hook, slip off your coat and your shoes, and take off your teffilin. The marks on your arm are more pronounced than usual. Your head is relieved.

You think about the fact that this is how it would be regularly if we still maintained the practice of wearing teffilin all day. Questions start filling your head:

What did they do on Rosh Chodesh? Today, we wear teffilin only until mussaf. Could this be what they did in ancient times? Does that make sense if you generally wear teffilin all day?

What about those who have the custom of wearing two different types of teffilin, to satisfy multiple opinions? Today, they take one pair off and put the second pair on. If the obligation were to wear teffilin all day, how could this be accomplished?

We get our teffilin checked now and then to make sure they’re still kosher. Did people have a second pair of teffilin to wear during the examination period?

And many other questions are imaginable.

But is there a place for such questions? We don’t wear our teffilin all day anymore. Should theoretical discussions be entertained? What good does it do for us to understand our world in a light that may never be cast?

The Gemara is filled with speculative tales and hypothetical considerations. The reality we live within is essential. Our bodies are bound by this reality. But God is not. Nor, to a lesser degree, are our minds. It is certainly simpler to put all of our attention on the world that is before us. But perceptions can be flawed, no matter how sincere the intentions. We have never believed that the ideal is found by blocking out from our consciousness the unrealized or undiscovered.

Those who put their teffilin on each morning must be aware that they will be taking their teffilin off far sooner than should be the case. To fully understand this, the mind is allowed to venture where the body cannot. It is in this way that we grow. To have dreams without reality is to escape. To have reality without dreams is to surrender. Judaism cannot survive—was not designed to exist—without reverie. One day, perhaps in our lifetime, we will be part of a reality in which we are wearing teffilin again as we used to. Like all good realities, though, if it is to exist at all, it must first exist intangibly.

Civil Marriages in Israel

The problem also exists outside of Israel. How to respond to two Jews wishing to marry not according to Halacha or, more correctly, live their lives not according to Halacha even as the Halacha imposes upon them. This is how I really see the issue in Israel. The question is not whether we should let a kohain marry a gerusha, a divorced woman. Perhaps it is better to state that this type of question is not the only question. The further question is whether I should participate in a bond of marriage according to Halacha when the individuals involved do not take Halacha and the marriage bond created according to Halacha seriously. thereby leading to greater challenges and problems.

This is a problem I continue to face as a rabbi. I may receive a call to perform a marriage between two non-observant individuals. What should I do? What standards should I set in agreeing to perform this marriage? Should I insist on the bride going to mikvah before the wedding, knowing full well that she most likely will not fulfill any of the requirements necessary to remove a woman from the state of being a niddah? Should I create this halachic bond between these two individuals recognizing that there may be a possibility that these same individuals will not treat this bond in a halachically serious manner? If the woman commits adultery in the future, the halachic status of the relationship will only make the repercussions more severe. If the marriage ends in divorce, should I be concerned that they may not search out a proper get thus rendering any subsequent relationship halachically adulterous and subsequent children mamzerim. Should my concern solely be to marry them according to Halacha, thereby at least removing some level of prohibition?

This are issues I face here in Toronto but they also represent the issues that are faced in Israel albeit with some differences. Since divorce is, for Jews, only al pi Halacha there is less of a chance that people will skip the necessity of a get. Yet how many Israelis going through a process of divorce live with others before their get? Should that be our concern? How are we to understand the imposition of Halacha on individuals who do not take it seriously or, even worse, are strongly opposed to this imposition? Kol Yisrael aravin zeh l'zeh and so I do have some obligation to impose halachic standards on fellow Jews yet, should I also not be concerned with long term implications of this imposing behaviour and potential backlash?

To many, it often seems that there is a nice, simple straightforward Torah answer to such problems -- and so keeping gittin and kiddushin in Israel al pi Halacha is most important. Sometimes, while recognizing the value of this, I wonder if it is?

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Mishnah At Shiva Possible Minhag Ta'us and an Elegent Solution

Here is the URL on our new Nishma-Minhag Yahoo Group:


http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Nishma-Minhag/message/3

Kol Tuv
Rabbi Richard Wolpoe [RRW]

Announcing new Nishma-Minhag discussion group

Your Nishma-Minhag group at Yahoo! Groups is good to go.

Here are the details on Nishma-Minhag:
Group home page: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Nishma-Minhag
Group email address: Nishma-Minhag@yahoogroups.com

Ready to start?
Get the ball rolling by posting the very first group message. Then add photos,
create an event, or whatever. In short, make yourself at home in your new
group.

Simply drop by the Nishma-Minhag homepage now. To keep the online conversation
moving, be sure to invite friends, family, and others who share your passion.

You can also check out Moderator Central to get the latest news, information,
and services for moderators:
http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=42511/*http://moderators.groups.yahoo.com/


Thanks,
Yahoo! Groups

11. Studying the Torah

It was a phenomenon that I wasn’t really aware of until I went to university: to many, the study of X does not necessarily require the study of X. For example, Shakespeare classes were replete with A-students who had, in actuality, read very little of Shakespeare’s work. What they had read was a large number of essays, articles and books devoted to the analysis and criticism of Shakespeare’s work. They had, so to speak, studied Shakespeare without studying Shakespeare.

To understand the distinction better, imagine a mysterious box. Your task is to examine and comprehend the nature and contents of this box. You have two possible routes: you could open the box and investigate its contents directly; or you could stand away from the box and study it as a whole. Let’s call the first approach Subjective Study (because you are inside the box) and the second approach Objective Study (because you are removed from the box). Perhaps there is merit in both approaches. But you can’t do both at the same time and you have to start with one—either inside or outside. Your choice.

Similar to the theory that former soldiers make better presidents or former players make better coaches, I believe that Subjective Study should take precedence over Objective Study. Once you’ve been in the box you are ready to step back from the box and judge it. But if you’ve never been in the box, you can’t possibly understand it from the outside.

The focus on secondary sources (Objective Study) is too safe (unless you’ve studied primary sources first). Those who have studied secondary sources are not called philosophers—they’re called “students of philosophy.” There’s a reason for that. The study of something—anything—should be dangerous. Like learning how to drive. The most intelligent people I know are afraid to drive (though it’s been reported that they’ve conquered their fears now and then). Learning how to drive is scary because if you make a mistake your life could be changed forever. That exact sensation should be felt no matter the subject you’re studying. If there’s a reason you’re learning what you’re learning then you have something invested in it; if you have something invested, you have something to lose. But Objective Study—studying the stars without looking at the stars—is indicative of sterile study. It brings to mind white gloves and thick glass panes. It is detached.

Study is not the process of storing and cataloging information. We have libraries and computers for such tasks. Study involves output, not just input. Knowledge should be absorbed with purpose. Time is short and it is far more likely that you will err than that you will succeed. This means that you have to get involved. It has to matter to you. If you’re frightened or confused or humbled by what you’re studying, there’s a good chance you’re doing something right. It means that if you really want to understand Hamlet, you have to read ‘Hamlet.’

TB Kiddushin 40b poses the question: given the choice, is it better to study Torah or to do mitzvoth? The final answer is that it is better to study Torah because “study leads to action.” But what happens when study no longer leads to action? Can you still call it study?

We can study the Torah without studying the Torah. We can continue to take steps away from the Torah and look at it noninvasively. But what will that accomplish? Does Objective Study even fulfill the mitzvah of Studying the Torah?

Separate Religion

In a recent article in the Jerusalem Post, there was a call for Conservative and Reform Jews to band together to declare themselves a separate religion and thereby form their own Chief Rabbinate. See http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1235410724103&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. This, the author argues, would then solve all the problems with the Orthodox in Israel. As a separate religion, adherents of this religion could make their own decisions regarding status and life cycle matters.

This is actually a most interesting suggestion but not really new. Rabbi J. David Bleich in one of his books states that years ago this offer was made to the Reform Rabbinate but they turned it down. It seems that they didn't want to be seen as a separate cult.

This is really the problem. Reform and Conservative Judaism don't just want to be recognized but they want to be seen as equal parts of the same religion with Orthodoxy. That is why this author's suggestion will be rejected by the very populace for whom he is trying to advocate. They are theologically already separate religions. The problem is that they don't want to see this.

In my article Adjective and Non-Adjective Jew (available at http://www.nishma.org/articles/introspection/introspection5761-2-adjective_jew.htm) my further contention is that the only possible way of achieving greater Jewish unity is through recognizing this reality. We cannot solve the problems of Jewish friction by just trying to avoid the reality that we do have major theological disagreements. We do. The answer is not through ignoring this reality. The answer is to accept this reality and figure out a way of working within it. A separate Chief Rabbinate could create other problems but it would force people to confront the theological distinctions between the branches of Judaism and recognize that many of the beliefs which they take for granted is actually only supported by Orthodox Judaism. It would stop people from having their cake and eating it too. That is why this suggestion will be rejected. Reform and Conservative Judaism don't want to be seen as being theologically separate from Orthodoxy.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Could Maimondies and Rambam be Different People

Rabbi JB Soloveichik was reputed to say:

The Rambam of the Mishneh Torah is not the Rambam of the Moreh Nevuchim.

This led to a computer driven investigation of Rambam's various and sundry works... it tseems that that the Rambam was a physician, philosopher, rabbinical leader and halachic legalist. The idea that a single human being could span 4 careers in a single lifetime made healthy skeptics into sick cynics

Qabbalists have posited the following solution:
That four individuals over four lifetimes shared a single recycled soul. This not only accounts for the multiplicity of talent spread over time it suggests that a greener earth could be had if we only re-cycled like the rambam did

However the anti-mystical rational cynics have come up with documentation and a hypothesis. Thus we have the documentation hypothesis.

Rambam was actually a committee of four whose writings were usually in distinct volumes. And tn order to engage in a grandiose cover-up to hide this fact elements of each can be found in any single document making it difficult to ferret out the truth. The followers of the quadruple theory have delineated the 4 authors as follows:

J E P D

P is for Philosopher. It could have been for Physican, too but that would have been too confusing. So

D was designated for Doctor and covers the medical writings. Now D could have stood for the "Deutoronomist" because the magnum opus after all is the dual Tprah aka Mishneh Torah. In order to avoid such confusion a new letter was sought

E stands for Encyclopaedist and stands for all of the Encyclopaedic writings including Mishneh Torah and Wiki-Torah

Finally the communal leader who wrote epistles both to Yemen and to Yenem as well was designated J.

J is for Jewish leader and is in the mold of Moses Ben Amram, Ben gurion, Ben zakkai and the Chinese Jewish leader Ben-Ching know for his effusive gratitude after consuming General Tso Chicken and Won-Ton Soup.

KT
RRW

Avot DeRabbi Reuven - The Four Reactions

The hypothetical Mishnah in Avot DeRabbi Reuven states

There are four groups who reacted to the 19th Century emancipation from the ghetto:

1. The First said revise thought and revise practice.
2. The Second said maintain traditional thought but revise practice.
3. The Third said maintain practice but revise traditional thought..
4. The Fourth said stay fast and alter neither traditional practice nor thought.

To which position dost thou adhere?

KT<
RRW

Avot DeRabbi Reuven - The Three Rabbis

Dedicated to the Spirit [Neshamah] of Mishnah Avot

There are 3 kinds of rabbis who decide Halachah [Jewish Law]

1. The Sources Expert
2. The Romantic
3. The Synthesiser
   

The first rabbi reads the sources well. Then he slavishly [and blindly] applies them. To what can this be compared? To a heartless computer that spits out cold facts. And Some say like a donkey that carries books

The second rabbi hears the question sees the person and ignores the sources. Rather he decides off the top of his head based upon his heart. This can be compared to an emotional lover who ignores reason and falls in love at first sight. Such a mercurial rabbi differs by mood and how he feels that day.

The third rabbi consults sources and colleagues. He delves into the topic then he applies his reason to read between the lines and to ferret underlying principles. Then he surveys the situation and decides by synthesising tradition and pragmatism To what is this third rabbi to be compared? To the wise King Solomon whose rapier wit saved the baby from the edge of the sword by evoking the truth using his God-given wisdom

-RRW

Standards Demands Two Yardsticks

There was an article I recently saw on the Jerusalem Post website, concerning two Orthodox women's organizations sending letters to Bibi Netanyahu requesting that he limit the jurisdiction of batei dinim, religious courts. See http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1235410717573&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. My initial reaction was: how could an Orthodox organization make such a request? Attendance at batei dinim rather than secular courts is a Torah command. Is it proper for an Orthodox organization to approach a secular power to, effectively, limit this attendance? Then I had my second reaction. What does this say about the batei dinim that these women are referring to? Is there not an obligation on beit din and its dayanim, judges, to be positively perceived by those that they judge? This is not to say that every litigant is going to feel good about the verdict -- but is it not incumbent of a beit din to positively present itself as a place of justice and fairness?

When someone receives a critique, this person cannot always assume that it is do to the yetzer hara of the other, that the other is doing an aveira in critiquing me. While the other may not be totally blameless, there still may be something within your behaviour that led to this critique. One also has to look at oneself. As much as the supporters of these batei dinim can critique these women's groups for challenging a halachic standard, it also incumbent on these supporters to evaluate themselves and the batei dinim they support to see if their is merit to these women's charges. The world is not black and white. Actions generally are neither totally good or totally bad. Its time to see the grey and accept the critique inherent even in action that one will also challenge.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

10. Reading the Shema

Any Psych-101 student can describe the psychological effects of repetition. Told something often enough, the average subject can be manipulated to believe countless falsities.

In this sense, repetition probably takes advantage of a part of the mind that builds up a sense of reality based on reliability: burn yourself once, it could be a fluke, but touch a fire for the third time and you accept the fact that there is a correlation between the fire and the consequential burn. But our mind might have a hard time distinguishing between the repetition of a lie and the repetition of something true.

The closest thing that Orthodox Judaism has to a mantra is the first sentence of the Shema. We repeat it twice daily in prayer, before bed, when we feel threatened, prior to death, etc.. It compresses the most essential aspect of our faith—belief in our God as a singular, universal God—into six words.

But the obligatory repetition could make even the most devout members of our faith a little cynical. Every time you say Shema, you’re using basic psychological tactics to convince yourself that “Hashem is God, Hashem is One.” There’s a good chance that part of the reason we believe in God is because we’ve been psychologically conditioned to believe in Him through the use of repetition.

No one wants to have a faith tainted by human weakness. But is there a way out?

The main problem is that if there is a psychological trap built into our religion, it’s built very well:

1. As long as we repeat the Shema regularly, we are conditioning ourselves to believe in God.
2. As long as we believe in God, we recognize the obligation to repeat the Shema.
3. As long as we repeat the Shema, we cannot test our faith.

But what if the repetition is the test?

There is a classic acting exercise developed by Sanford Meisner that calls for two actors to say the same word or phrase back and forth to each other until they are somehow internally compelled to change. The exercise is known as Repetition.

The theory behind the exercise is that the most important aspect of acting is listening. The somewhat meditative process of repeating the same phrase over and over allows both actors to become focused on the ‘reality of the moment’ rather than the self. Though the rules of the game are simple, it is, in actuality, quite a difficult task to master. Two well-trained actors engrossed in a round of Repetition is an impressive, and often inspiring, thing to watch.

Interestingly, the six-word first paragraph of Shema is two words too long. There’s no reason, as a mantra, for the words “Shema Yisrael” (“Hear, Israel”) to be expressed. But if the repetition of Shema has a purpose similar to Meisner’s intent regarding his acting exercise, the very essence is hearing and understanding. This may also be why, unlike any other prayer, we cover our eyes when we say Shema, to help us concentrate on what we hear, not what we say.

Perhaps the reading of Shema is a conversation. You say to Israel: “Hear: Hashem is God, Hashem is One.” And the Shema is repeated back to you when someone else calls out to Israel. And this continues, constantly testing the sincerity of your statement. Does Israel believe you? Do you believe Israel? Are you compelled to move? Are you really listening?

Tobacco and Abortion - The Halachic Parameters

This is the result of a dialogue on the Halachic Parameters of hot-Button issues such as Tobacco and Abortion. Can we employ reasonable techniques or will politically correct emotion overwhelm our best efforts at objective analysis?

Part 1

There are those who believe regarding Tobacco:

Since even one cigarette does physical damage to the body;
Therefore even a single cigarette violates Jewish law.

Q: What about the psychological relief from that cigarette? Apparently - this argument goes - psychological relief in the presence of physical damage has no standing.

Now let's take abortion.

Given any fetus who imposes a physical threat then the mother has the right or obligation to abort. Why? The fetus is deemed a pursuer and forfits its physical right to exist so long as it physically threatens its mother.

Conversely, if the fetus poses no physical threat but rather a psychological one, then combined with the first principle the mother may not abort. This is since psychological relief does not justify definite physical harm, killing or even physically harming the fetus would be off-limits.


Part 2

So if Joe Camel gets a psychological lift from lighting up, then who are we to stop him based upon the physical damage?

Ladies and Gentlemen, can we have consistency?

Or are we REALLY saying:

Since abortion is politically correct, therefore we find Jewish sources to support our agenda
AND conversely
Since smoking is politically incorrect therefore we outlaw even a single cigarette by applying laws of kashrut?

Well Rabbi Rich What's the alternative?

Here is a suggestion:

Get read of sweeping generalizations, platitudes, sloganeering, and propoganda and judge each case on its own merits. But what's the fun if we cannot impose our authoritarian beliefs upon others than ourselves? (Smile)

Part 3

Mr. Ed Frankel Saw through my straw man and responded as follows

I believe that there is a major difference. There is no doubt that those who do smoke get some pleasure from the action, even if it is addiction induced. If it was not enjoyed, it would not be done. Pleasure, I sense, is the psychological lift to which the questioner alludes.


However, deriving pleasure and suffering mental illness are not two sides of the same coin. If we accept that mental illness is an illness, with potential lethal side effects if not treated or if improperly treated, then mental illness ought not be treated differently from any other physical malady.

That does not suggest that every woman who has some stress in her life ought to use that stress to legitimate having an abortion. Heck we all have stresses, and those stresses are part of living. As a father, I also remember the concerns when preparing for the birth of all three of my children. Would any have been construed as rationales for my wife to have an abortion, if she even shared the same doubts?

However, if a woman truly believes her life will be in jeopardy if she gives birth. If bringing a fetus to term presents insufferable hardship that no person in his/her right mind would normally face, is that not an adequate reason for pikuach nefesh?

I in no way suggest that abortion ever become an alternative to birth control. To my mind that would be heinous. However, to compare having an abortion with smoking a cigarette is at its best a reduction ad absurdum.

Ed Frankel

Part 4

FWIW, I think Ed Nailed the reply in a most rational fashion,
however the question remains

Given that pork is prohibited even in minute quantities:

Are cigarettes equally forbidden?
Or
Are cigarettes only forbidden on a habitual, consistent bases but an occasional smoke is OK unlike pork; in that the short-term pleasure is not intrinsically outweighed by long term risk - just like fatty pastrami?

Kt
RRW

On Being a Rabbi's Child and On Being

It is three o'clock in the morning and, having slept so much this week of illness and fever and delirium, and with so many thoughts racing through my head, I cannot sleep. So, instead, I have read a post on my uncle Avrum's blog. It was an older post, about growing up the son of a rabbi, growing up in a small town, growing up with danger and adventure and anti-Semitism and parents with a mission. It has got me thinking.

Now anyone who knows me knows that thinking is what I do - constantly, like breathing - and when I run out of thoughts then I start thinking about the emptiness of my brain or the world that I see or the people around me - and if I can't find something to latch onto among all that then I will find solace in thinking about numbers. But, still, for all my thinking, my uncle's stories got me thinking in a way that made me want to write. And so here I am, telling all who read this the intimate details of my brain at 3 am.

I am thinking of what my uncle and I share - life as a rabbi's child. It is funny that one man's choice can brand a whole group of people with a title. My father and my grandfather chose to become rabbis - they studied, they passed tests, they dedicated their time and their lives. My mother and my grandmother just fell in love. And me and my siblings? All we did was be born. And yet, here we are - rabbi's children. And we take it very seriously.

My uncle was right in his blog - a rabbi's family doesn't know the privacy of just being, without an audience. In many ways, though, the rest of the world is forgetting that level of privacy too. With things like blogs and Facebook, camera phones and YouTube - the privacy of unexamined (by others) moments seems to be something of the past. Whether as a rabbi's daughter or as a citizen of the 21st century - I am being watched by people. It is unbelievably scary.

But as a rabbi's daughter, it just seems more intense. I remember the first time I entered a shul and I was just a congregant - one of many - someone who wasn't expected to know the answers to all the questions or help those who needed assistance - someone who was, foremost, responsible for her prayers and not the comfort and prayers of everyone around her. I was 21.

Sometimes I get asked halachic questions and I want to say: why are you asking me? Sometimes I don't get asked halachic questions and I want to say: why aren't you asking me? Sometimes, although I'm never proud of it, I will pull out the "rabbi's daughter" card in an argument to shut up someone who is stupid enough to warrant me playing dirty - those are the kinds of people who will respond to my "title" before listening to the wisdom or stupidity of my words and so, although I'm not proud to do it, I’m also not ashamed.

When I was in college, I was the unofficial posek for most of my chevra (excluding the other rabbis' kids, of course); it was a scary and awful responsibility but not one I was unused to. Lucky for me, my father was on speed dial.

I have more respect for rabbis than the average Jew because I lived with one my whole life and I saw all the sacrifices he's made to be a scholar and moral leader for our people. I have less awe for rabbis than the average Jew because I lived with one my whole life and I know they are not gods - they are men - they make jokes and root for basketball teams, they stay up worrying when their daughters go out. I have empathy and sadness and pride for all rabbis' children. We understand each other.

When I was interviewing for law firms I had to answer the question what made me get interested in the law. My answer always began with the fact that I was raised in a rabbi's home, at which point I would have to explain the implications of that and how it factored in. one time though, as soon as I said that I was a rabbi's daughter, the interviewer - a black woman with the hint of the southern lilt of one of the Carolinas - said to me: say no more, I’m a preacher's kid. I liked her choice of terms because that's the truth more clearly than one can ever get out of the word rabbi.
My father is a preacher - I mean, he's a rabbi but he, predominantly, preaches. Rabbis say a lot of beautiful things that people like to hear but where their job gets tough is when they have to preach - they have to say the unpopular stuff. They have to say assur and treif because the world can't always be kosher and mutar. They have to weave mussar into sermons and sermons into mussar. And, most difficult of all, thy have to find a way to say to a student "respect me" and they have to find a way to explain that they only say it because Gd commands that his scholars be respected.

I have watched men of ignorance insult my father and I have watched him walk away and cry, not for his feelings or his ego but because he feels that he did not defend the Torah within him and he cries for the Torah. And I cry for him.

Rabbis’ kids have great stories - my uncle is right about that. We get to see a part of the world that other people don't. Some of my favorite childhood memories are definitively the moments I was a rabbi's kid.

And as to the psychological theory that the clergy's children can be a little screwed up? Well, I haven't done studies but every rabbi's kid I’ve ever met, including myself, is a little weird and I think we'd all admit it.

But it is the tears that, I think, bind us more than anything else. To be a rabbi's child is to be witness to struggle and sorrow. Even the most beloved of rabbis has followers who leave him and, given the dark side of eilu v' eilu, all rabbis have enemies (most often those followers of another rabbi who are foolish enough not to understand that disagreement is meant to stay in the beis medrash).

So, I sit here at three in the morning and wonder about my brothers and sister and my mother and her siblings and all my friends who, like me, are preachers' kids. How many times have we each seen disrespect? How many times have we watched our fathers mistreated? And how many times did we watch our fathers whisper promises to the Torah, to try to protect it better, to be a better vessel for it, less of a target? I sit here and wonder.

My mother used to say that the problem with some congregations is that everyone wants their rabbi to be a shepherd but they also want him obedient. No one would go to a doctor and say to the doctor: look, I’m paying you for this so you better say I’m in perfect health. You pay the doctor for the truth, for advice on how to be healthy. Rabbis aren't treated like that. Part of it is in the system - rabbis want to be able to give people the answer they want to hear. Every rabbi I’ve ever met has pulled more than his fair share of all-nighters in search of the elusive heter for a distraught student. But "no", to many people, often does not mean no - it means find another rabbi.

I guess what it boils down to, all my musings, is right there in the Torah:
If you ever want to understand why Yitzchak redug his father's wells - ask a rabbi's son. It's not easy following a top act.
Want to know why Moshe hit the rock - ask a rabbi's daughter (and stand back). Followers are never easy to deal with.
But ask a preacher's kid why Moshe defended his nation to the death. They are a stiff-necked bunch but their leaders love them, no matter what.

And, ask me if I wish my father was a lawyer or doctor or accountant. No, I don't.

Sometimes I don't understand why my father loves Jews as much as he does, why he doesn't want to "hit the rock" more often. Sometimes I want to hit every rock in sight. And being a Yitzchak makes me want to scream more often than it makes me want to laugh.
But every once in a while I remember how lucky I am.

I have a rabbi on speed dial. And I get to be a Yitzchak. I get to help represent Torah scholarship. Hopefully I do a good job. Sometimes I’m scared I really don't. Then I take a deep breath and dig some wells, walk a bit on a well worn path, in my father's footsteps - slowly tentatively branching out from there.

And, more often than not, when I get really frustrated or scared, I remember that I’m not just a rabbi's daughter, I’m also a daughter of Israel. And, whether as one or the other, I represent the Torah of my teachers and my Gd.

And sometimes, at hours like this, I curl up in some of my favorite memories - moments when, as a little girl or young woman - I watched my father talk Torah with other rabbis - their faces alight with passion and wisdom; I remember that I once went shopping with my father and he ran into another rabbi and they began to argue and discuss Sinai - right there in the canned vegetable aisle - and I could have grabbed the list from my father's hand because I knew there was no way he was going to be involved in the shopping from that moment on - but I chose, instead, to come back with each item and then run off for the next one - and just so I could have the chance to catch bits of their conversation and so they would have more time to talk. Great thoughts were dissected in that store - and my father shared it all with me on the ride home - and I think, ironically, we forgot to get canned peas.

I remember one Shavous I got into a fierce argument with the daughter of a Lubavitch rabbi - no minor debates for us - we went at the notion of tzimtzum with full force, calling each other heretics at least once each in the course of it all. Next to her stood her father and next to me stood my father - they were good friends; as the conversation continued, our fathers subtly steered us through the great philosophical debate that we were acting out - the classic mitnagid-chassidic dance - we did not change each other's minds but we were friends by the end and, I feel, had properly welcomed Sinai. Our fathers discussed us afterwards, each complimenting the other's daughter, each voicing philosophical loyalty to the views espoused by his own child.

It’s now almost five in the morning - I do not know what these ramblings tell me. I guess I miss my family and I miss my childhood. I miss when being a rabbi's daughter meant nothing more than getting to sit at the front of the shul. But I also don't.

~ dodi-lee hecht

The Communications Divide

How people read and respond to a column in a newspaper is the focus of Rabbi Hecht's latest column in the Jewish Tribune (Toronto). Many responded to Rabbi Hecht's previous column regarding protests by Jews against Israel's action's in Gaza. That previous article is available at
http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/content/view/1285/53/. His latest article responds to these responses, in many ways questioning how they understood what they read.

To view this latest article, go to http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/news/combined-weekly--daily/the-communication-divide.html.

Normative Reality

It just seems to me that so many of the arguments that exist regarding certain behaviour in the Torah world can be reduced to divergent viewpoints in response to one simple question: how does Torah connect to, what I may term, normative reality?

Let us assume that there is a normative behaviour that exists in this world in response to a specific situation. For example, if two people wish to get married and raise a family, they have to be concerned about their livelihood and the physical needs of this family. So, in deciding to marry and when to have children, they have to consider their financial resources. Once, though, someone accepts the truth of Torah, how does this person respond to these same issues? Now, the truth is that there are divergent halachic viewpoints and my issue is not really the halacha per se. My question is: what are people really looking for? In other words, when someone accepts Torah, what consequence do they really want in terms of this issue? Some would still maintain the same concerns as most other people in the world recognizing that Torah could affect the decision somewhat -- the Torah Jew cannot just take their time as may be the normative response. Other, though, will see in the view of Torah a desired direction to break from normative cause-and-effect and operate on a different plane.

These two poles actually represent to me the essence of so much of the disagreements that exist within the Torah world. There is a normative cause-and-effect that Torah will affect. The question is: how we relate to such a circumstance. Some want this to be so, that Torah takes you to a different plane of existence and the more that Torah leads you to reject normative cause-and-effect, the more desired that conclusion. There are others who, while recognizing that Torah will, at times, reject the decision of normative cause-and-effect, wish such situations to be limited as they would still rather work within this plane. So much of the debate within the Torah world seems to revolve around this issue. Some want normative cause -and-effect to be the base. Some specifically do not want this normative structure to have much voice. This core difference in outlook just seems to permeate throughout the Torah world and explains, in my opinion, so much.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Journalism, Fairness, and Soapboxes

Journalism has a standard that has been recently blurred News on the news pages. Opinions on the editorial pages. Honest people who are vigilant would like to restore this kind of reporting.

Stating opinion as fact and especially controversial opinion as fact undermines fairness. When I taught MPA courses for FDU, I extended this doctrine of distinction as follows:

• When the Bible says x it is a source. When you use a spin or interpretaition then label it such and do not pass it off as source but as spin/interpretation.

• Illustration: the 2 eldest sons of Aaron were burned to death for introducing an alien fire into their service. This appears in the Pentateuch at least 4 times. The first in Leviticus 10:1

Someone once used this source as a proof text to not add to the service of God in general.

It violates both fairness and honesty:

1. Fairness because it's a spin on the text and many commentators do not see it this way at all.
2. Honesty because it uses the Bible as a source instead of honestly citing the commentator that originated the spin.

If my student did this I would have pointed it out as such. Using interpretations was fine but I would fine them a grade for passing it off as source text.

Illustration:

• So if for example the Hertz commentary had this particular spin then cite Hertz and not the 5 Books of Moses else one is playing fast and loose.

Partial quotes can be harmful in removing context. So one ought to b e thorough.

Regards,
Rrw

Yitro: The Flow of Sinai

Originally published 2/13/09, 11:45 AM.
To many, the goal of religion is to attain a greater and greater religious or spiritual experience. Within the realm of Torah, though, the Jewish nation has already reached the pinnacle of religious experiences, the Revelation at Sinai. So what then is the Jewish religious experience or process through life?

Rabbi Hecht addresses this issue in an Insight from 5758 available at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5758-13.htm

Irony or Hypocrisy?

Many years ago whilst touring Faneuil Hall in Boston, the guide remarked that it was here that brewmaster Samuel Adams would passionately advocate free speech. And when anyone bothered to debate him he would shout them down and heckle them.

Robert Moses was all about helping the masses of people. When the Cross Bronx Exeressway threatened to destroy middle class neighborhoods in The Bronx, he said that progress to help people is more important than the damage to those neighborhoods.

When popular revolutions in France and Russia were not fanatic enough, freedom was co-erced by the likes of Robespierre, Bonaparte and Bolsheviks! Did co-ercing freedom work? And will it work in Iraq?

Here is a quickie word of Torah:

Zedek zedek tirdof!
Tr: justice justice shalt thou pursue.

Q: Why is justice repeated? Is that not redundant?

One A: the first "Zedek" is an adjective so it SHOULD read: JUST justice shalt thou pursue.

Iow the ends do not justify the means.

On my Mom obm's note board:

Gandhi: take care of the means and the ends will take care of themselves!

--
Kol Tuv Best Regards,
RRW
NishmaRRW@gmail.com

Centrism - Eizehu Meqoman

Briefly:
Let's make a few general principles:

1. The problem with left wingers is that they throw away the baby with the bathwater:
2. The problem with right wingers is that they keep both baby and bathwater!

Eizehu Mekomam is CENTRAL to Qorbanoth, nevertheless it is usually davened up with such haste that one is not really yotzei limud mishnah at all.

Most Left Wing siddurim simply omit it.

Many Right Wing Minyanim say it @ warp-drive speed.

How about a "Centrist Solution?"

Eizehu Meqoman has mishnayoth. Instead of rushing through all 8 daily, say it once with care over the span of a week. In other words {IOW} Say 1 mishnah ever weekday and double up and say 2 on Shabbath.

Now:

1. You have fulfilled your daily dose of mishnah
2. You cover an essential core of Qorbanoth instead of benign neglect
   
3. You need no longer rush

Kol Tuv
RRW

9. Sanctifying God’s Name

Would you die to defend God’s Name?

It really doesn’t come up much in our daily lives, thankfully. Our faith is not generally held at gunpoint. The positive side of this is obvious and we should be constantly aware and appreciative of this relative luxury. But what might we lose in a world that doesn’t mortally threaten us at the core of our religious beliefs?

What does it take to be religious in modern times? Eating restrictions? Who, in our world today, is not on some kind of diet? Daily commitments? You go to synagogue, he gets piano lessons, she volunteers at the orphanage—everyone has commitments. Structured behaviour? We all have our hobbies and idiosyncrasies.

You study the Torah while they study ancient architecture—so what? We rest on Saturday while they go the spa or meditate in the garden—so what? She won’t wear pants and she won’t wear skirts and he won’t wear shirts—so what?

It’s what we call a lifestyle. And the fact is, everybody sacrifices to maintain one, not just religious people. What makes your lifestyle decisions distinct from anybody’s lifestyle decisions?

A friend of mine never wore a kippah. I didn’t have to ask him the reason. I knew why he never wore a kippah: he didn’t believe in God. He was raised religious, went to religious schools, had religious friends, but at some point in his life he realized he didn’t believe in it. One night, a couple of years ago, he was particularly excited about a woman he was going out with. She was, as he described her, everything he wanted: “Smart, funny, beautiful…frum.” As he left for the date, just after spraying cologne on his neck, just before putting a mint in his mouth, he pulled a kippah out of his pocket and clipped it to his hair.

Later that night, after the date was over (and the kippah was off again), my friend explained: “You’re right. I don’t believe in it. But it’s still the best way I know to raise your kids, to have a family, to be part of a good community.”

Now if my friend were put in a position where he had to choose between death and defaming God’s name, the choice would be easy. He’s an atheist. It’s about lifestyle, and, as the name suggests, without life there’s not much to style.

But what about us, the so-called Believers? Could we face death eye-to-eye for God?

From where we stand, our religious practice is, by outside standards, indistinguishable, in essence, from any other lifestyle-choice. Your actions cannot prove your motives. Everything we do can be done for multiple reasons. How removed are we, in truth, from my friend’s drive for a lifestyle?

Although it’s certainly not always easy to follow Halacha, what ulterior incentives might compel us to adhere to it, regardless of faith?

Put yourself ten feet from a six-man firing squad. Beside you is a short, stout gold statue depicting a creature you’ve never seen before. You have thirty seconds to decide: bow down and declare the statue god or stand and await execution. What do you do?

The Perceived Issue is not the Real Issue: Rabbi Haskel Lookstein and Yossi Fackenheim

Much has been made of two recent events that have stirred up the Orthodox world if not the entire Jewish world. One is the case of Yossi Fackenheim and his gerut kattan, conversion as a child, which has been challenged by a bet din in Israel. The other is the attendance of Rabbi Haskel Lookstein at an interfaith prayer service, in a church, marking the inauguration of Presiden Obama. The truth is that each matter should initiate Torah debate and discussion. That is actually the way of limud haTorah. And the differing sides should be adament in their positions, fighting it out in the ring of halachic analysis, as they advocate for their respective positions. The problem is, though, that halachic machloket is, also, supposed to leave room for acceptable dissent, for the acceptance of a divergent opinion, with which one may still vehemently disagree, as part of the realm of Torah.

That is not what seems to be occurring in either of these cases. Rabbi Lookstein's position seems not to be accepted as a position -- with which one may still vehemently disagree, presenting numerous halachic arguments against it -- that is still considered part of Torah. This can be identified in the way that Rabbi Lookstein's view is being approached. If Rabbi Lookstein believed that he was acting pursuant to Halacha, we should still be relating to his behaviour as an action al pi Torah, even as we feel that decision is wrong. This is a subtle point within the Halacha. Even as we may feel, and decide, that a certain piece of meat is not kosher, if another competently determines that this piece of meat is kosher and then eats it, even as we disagree with this conclusion, we must see this person as following the law and not transgressing it -- for the person was not rejecting Torah but defining it in a different manner (we are , of course, assuming that this person has competancy in making such decisions). This is even more so in the case of a bet din. Piercing the veil on another bet din's decision is highly controversial. Yet in this case this is precisely what was done. The view with which this bet din in Israel disagreed was not perceived as part of Torah yet a position with which they disagreed. It was defined as outside of Torah. This problem is not, with each day, coming to a critical point.

Yet, we may now have the opportunity to see what the root of this problem is and what we truly have to challenge, and for what we must truly advocate. Rabbi Avi Shafran is quoted as saying, in response to the Israeli bet din's decision to negate the conversion of Yossi Fackenheim, that:

"“It indicates that the single standard of Halachah – which is the sole true unifier of the Jewish people – is being taken seriously by Israel’s rabbinate.”

(See http://www.cjnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16221&Itemid=86)

So, therein, lies the problem -- the mistaken belief that Torah unity is based upon a "single standard of Halachah." Adamency in a narrow range of halachic understanding actually can yield disunity and worse. The famed last Rosh Yeshiva of the great yeshiva of Volozhin, Rabbi Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, the Ntziv, wrote in numerous places that such narrowmindedness was the basis for the sinat chinum, the free hatred, that led to the destruction of the Temple. The "sole true unifier of the Jewish people" is the concept of eilu v'eilu -- of course, applied correctly within the directions of the halachic spectrum -- and the true source of dissension and animosity, unfortunately, arises from statements such as this.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Another Priest with an Attitude - Wagging the Dog

The reinstatement of a priest who is a Holocaust denier by the Pope has generated, and rightfully so, a tremendous outcry from the Jewish world. It seems, though, that he is not the only priest with a problem with the Holocaust. Ynet reported of another priest who, while not a Holocaust denier and while admitting that there were 6 million Jews killed in the Holocaust, still felt it appropriate to compare the recent Israeli defensive incursion into Gaza to the Holocaust. (See http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3664042,00.html.) After all, he maintained, what is the difference between 6 million and 1 thousand? In a certain way, that is true; the gemara does compare the life of a single person to the entire corpus of humanity -- but the comparison is ridiculous and not simply because of the numbers. In a certain way, I feel that even presenting the numerous ways why this comparison is more than ludicrous is an affront to the Holocaust itself. The real question is how could this priest, how could any sane person, make such a statement?

Ah, but the answer is actually also presented in the Holocaust. In the last paragraph of the Ynet article, it quotes the priest as referring to Jews as killers of God and calling upon them to repent and accept Jesus. So that's the point. It really is a case of the tail wagging the dog. If non-believers in Jesus are going to Hell, such non-believers must be evil. If they are evil, they must do evil acts. It is very difficult to contend that non-believers are going to Hell if they actually act in a good fashion. Why would a deity send such fine doers of good to Hell just for not believing in him? Must be that they don't do good things. In the end, this priest wants Jews to be labeled as evil -- it goes with his religious perspective. It thus serves his religious perception to compare Gaza to the Holocaust. And if you have a problem with that, remember the great Catholic proclamation of faith credo qui absurdum est, I believe because it is absurd. This priest is just practicing his faith.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Transplant Query

Ynews presented this article, at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3663653,00.html, regarding the comments of the father of an 8yr. old Charedi girl, in Israel, who received a heart and lung transplant. The father stated that while it was permitted for the family to accept an organ transplant, they would never donate one of their organs as that would be in contravention of Halacha. The article then quoted the comments of one of the doctors involved in the transplant who found this position to be unethical. The question is how to respond to such a challenge?

There were actually many variant issues addressed in the article, some introduced, I believe, to attempt to embarrass the Charedi world. I actually found myself quite impressed with many of the presented statements of the father who had to deal with many questions which were attempted assaults on his belief. For example, there was an attempt to make an issue out of the fact that the organs came from an 8yr. old Arab boy and how the father and family may feel about the daughter now having Arab organs. The father dealt with that, in my opinion, in a very proper way, making a point of his sympathy for the loss of the Arab family, sending them a note to express his thanks but also his condolences on their terrible loss. Yet, there was still the issue of the transplant itself. In stating that he would accept an organ transplant but not donate an organ, the father opened himself, and the Torah world, to potential criticism for being takers and not givers, for not being, essentially, fair.

To be honest, I found much confusion in the article. There is a distinction between heart transplants and other organ transplants and this distinction was not clear in the article. While there is still some controversy regarding general organ transplants, there is a more intense debate regarding heart transplants as the halachic definition of death, a matter of great controversy, is at the centre of this issue. The article seemed to treat the entire issue of transplants within the confines, though, of this latter issue. Thus, one is left unsure whether this family was specifically talking about heart transplants or whether they were also, effectively, saying that they would follow the stringent opinion in regard to all organ donations. This, though, would a matter of interest to one knowledgeable of the halachic issues. The real question is, though: how to deal with this in the face of a public that would look upon it in negative terms?

Concepts such as chilul Hashem or m'pnei eiva immediately come to mind. What is permissible in the deviation of the prima facie halachic position due to these broader halachic constructs? To what extent should we be concerned with the view of non-Jews or non-halachic Jews when their viewpoint is not technically cognisant with the position of Halacha? Rav Moshe makes a distinction between a value that a non-Jew broadly perceives to be part of Torah and one that arises simply from the non-Jew's personal value system. We are not concerned that the non-Jew doesn't like our values; we are concerned that the non-Jew believes that we are not abiding by a value that they believe is in Torah. This parameter would seem to apply in this case. How much do we consider how others will look at us in cases such as these? How much weight would this consideration have in the halachic decision-making that would surround such a case?

One thing did hit me though? In situations where there is a recognized disagreement, machloket, in the Torah Law, these types of concerns may be a factor in considering the use of a more lenient position albeit that the normative decision follows the more stringent opinion. If this is true, whether we see the disagreement over death as a machloket in Halacha or whether one side views the other side as outside the pale could have a great significance in approaching this issue. Let us postulate a rule that one who has had a close family member receive a transplant should accept a lenient view and become a donor in order to avoid the possibility of a chilul Hashem. This would avoid a condemnation such as in this case. The application of such a rule, though, would depend on whether one sees the divergent opinions as a machloket within Torah or simply as the presentation of the proper view while others present an incorrect view.

The application of the concept of eiva to these type of cases may also be of interest. If Shabbat is affected by this concept, then what would be the affect of this concept in this type of case. The fact that this may concern retzicha, murder, though, in the case of heart transplants abiding by the view that cessation of heart beat is the only determinant of death, may make the application of this concept here, albeit its application concerning Shabbat, most difficult. It should also be noted that, even regarding Shabbat, there is some controversy regarding this concept. See, for example, the Mishna Brura on the subject.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

The Intersection of Halacha and Aggadah

Preface:

Micha Berger - The esteemed moderator of the Avodah list - and I have oft bitterly disagreed on the conflation of halachah and aggadah. Recently we discussed Rabbi Soloveichik's original takes on several points. I asked permission to share his thoughts on this list.

KT

RRW

Part 1

" A side effect of the loss of "erev Shabbos Jews" (which is RYBS's : term, not mine) iýs that they don't know how to relate to the notion of : something done to aid avodah, but isn't a chiyuv/issur.
:
: As one fellow put it on scjm recently: I don't like "shades of d issur".
:
I countered -- and you would NOT agree to my seifa, I presume -- that not only must one accept chumros and not only walk shuras hadin, but the shurah between din and chumrah is therefore blurry.

Part 2

"You have my permission, although I would prefer being quoted by name. Even if your point is to present it as a hava amina to reject. (And U would also enjoy seeing the responses.)

I think chumros are part of qadesh es atzmekha bemah shemutar lakh, ve'saisa hayashar vehatov, and Rabbah bar R' Huna's obligation to pay the workers who broke his barrels. And recall that the gemara ends up saying the lattermost is both a chumrah and a chiyuv -- at least for RbRH. (It's BM 83a.)

Chumros are a place where aggadita and halakhah meet, where each person is obligated to live up to their own ideals, regardless of whether it can be spelled out as a blanket statement for all of Kelal Yisrael with shiurim or whatnot"

--Micha Berger
Moderator of. Avodah and Areivim

How Could Jews Protest...and as Jews?

Protests against Israel in the Gaza war were upsetteing in their own right. What was even more intolerable, though, was the fact that Jews joined in these protests emphatically announcing that they were Jews, and as Jews were protesting -- like it was some real and true expression of their Jewishness.
An article on this subject, by Rabbi Hecht, was recently published in the Jewish Tribune (Toronto). To view the article on line, go to http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/content/view/1285/53/

8. Walking In God’s Ways

WWJD. The solution to all your religious quandaries: What Would Jesus Do? Abbreviated W.W.J.D. and emblazoned on bracelets, bumper stickers, backpacks, mugs, etc., it’s a small reminder—like a string around the finger—to help Christians during the dark moments of confusion. Not sure of the right thing to do? Just do what the alleged son of God would do.

The joke is: who exactly are you asking? This little, objective Jesus that lives in your head?

For example, imagine that you pass a hungry person begging for food. You’re half-a-block away and you stop to consider your actions. Should you go back and give the person something to eat? Well: “What would Jesus do?”

Are you asking for an objective ruling? In other words, are you reaching outside of yourself for direction? Or are you asking for a personal ruling, reaching into yourself to identify your own sense of right and wrong?

The difference is significant yet how often are we consciously aware of which question we’re asking? ‘What Would Jesus Do?’ attempts objectivity: “Jesus would go back and give the guy some food.” But how do you know?

Recently I was having a conversation with someone discussing the issue of abortion. I could cite varying opinions from a Halachic perspective but when asked for my personal opinion I had to admit that I didn’t have a response. My chavruta complimented me, suggesting that this showed a level of devotion to the Halacha. I disagreed. I had allowed the Halacha to act as a surrogate for my own morality.

Belief in God means that we believe in an objective system of right and wrong—whether or not we have a clear view of this system is a different matter. The belief in objective morality can cloud the fact that our senses provide us with subjective information and we are incapable of definitively disassociating our thoughts from our imperfect brains. Essentially, any attempt at objectivity must come from a starting point of subjectivity and there’s no escaping that. We may be able to know an objective morality but any sincere person must admit that we can’t objectively know that it is objective.

If the Halacha, as you understand it, obligates you to return to give food to the hungry, what choice do you have? But having our eyes on God does not absolve us from our responsibility to conduct an investigation faced inward as well.

If it is found that there is a conflict between the Halacha and your personal morality, what will you do? Will you take it as a sign that your morality is flawed? Or will you see it as an indication that you’ve misunderstood the Halacha? Will you try to manipulate the Halacha to bend to your personal beliefs? Or will you sublimate your feelings and defer to God?

On the other hand, it may be discovered that there is no conflict between the Halacha and your personal morality. That’s certainly convenient, but can you trust this symbiosis? How do you know that you haven’t self-regulated your ethical system to conform to Halacha? How do you know that you haven’t coloured your understanding of Halacha to match your morality?

This is why asking questions such as ‘What would Jesus do?’ can be self-deceptive. (Naturally, there may be Christians who understand the question on a more complex level; I’m looking at it colloquially.) These questions are in the business of objectifying the inherently subjective. ‘What Would Jesus Do?’ asks you to objectively answer a hypothetical question. Hidden in the background, directing the path, is your personal morality, camouflaged by religious devotion. There are two questions; WWJD asks only one. And, like most two-in-one devices, it really doesn’t satisfy either of its goals very effectively.

I doubt there is a simple way to rectify the conflict between God and Self. But I don’t think we’re called upon to erase ourselves. How often do we see someone taught to discount his/her personal morality in light of Halacha eventually abandon orthodoxy entirely? How long can we tell the feminist, the homosexual, the pacifist, the vegetarian, the egalitarian, the artist that any morality that is inconsistent with Halacha must be suppressed? How long can that last before the Self fights back? But if Halacha represents Truth, what good could it do to let the Self take God by the leash? Dialogue is the only solution. Personal morality is sharpened when challenged by Halacha and Halacha grows and develops in the hands of worthy individuals.

The search for an objective morality has its best shot at validity when we each have a voice of our own to bring to the table. Otherwise, who knows what lurking beliefs pull strings beneath the surface? “You will walk in His ways (Devarim 28:9).” The subject, as with all the commandments, is you.

A New Tactic

I really wasn't surprised by the article by Khadafi that I saw in a recent edition of the Toronto Star. (See http://www.thestar.com/article/576455 ) It seems that the article was syndicated to many papers in North America and, perhaps, around the world. I was a bit surprised that the article came from Khadafi but I was just waiting for the Arabs to come up with this idea. Why not have just one big, democratic, state combining Jews and Arabs in the land that is called Israel and/or Palestine? This is an idea that the Western World can clearly embrace. The fact that Khadafi is the one making this suggestion would really appeal to the Western World. He will be seen as one who has repented, as one who has embraced democracy. Khadafi in his article even declares that he understands why Jews need a land and is willing to accept their presence on the land. All the Arabs want is democracy; would that ever sell in the West?

And, of course, the Arabs will get want they want anyway. Such a democratic state, especially with an ever growing Arab population that will surpass the Jewish population soon, if it has not already done so, could not possibly be a Jewish state. And what has happened in Gaza shows that even when this "democratic" population votes in a totalitarian government, there will still be support for this "democratically, elected government" in the West -- which means that when this population turns its totalitarian objectives against the Jewish population in this theoretical democracy, there will always be the argument that its the democratic will.

I just hope that the ploy turns against Khadafi. Rather than Westerners being even more supportive of this idea because it comes from a "repentant totalitarian", they will recognize that it is another ploy from a manipulative dictator who has just come up with another way to achieve his totalitarian goal.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Moral Confusion: Selling Virginity

Originally published 1/25/09, 4:22 PM.
There was a news article I saw on the CNN website that caught my attention. See
http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/01/22/virginity.value/index.html?iref=newssearch. It seems that a 22 yr. old woman is auctioning "her virginity" over the internet and the latest bid is at 3.8 Million U.S. Dollars. Of course, the amount itself will gain attention from the curiousity of the general public; perhaps, so will the basic idea itself. I found myself, though, interested in this story for what it may indicate about human nature and the moral fabric of individuals. I was not surprised to find that the questions that were bothering me were not really addressed in what I read. In fact, more questions arose.

The basic underlying structure of what was being presented seemed contradictory to me. Here was a woman, 22 yrs old, who is stating that she was a virgin. What type of woman, in our modern world, would still be a virgin at 22? We would think that there must have been some moral reason for her to have made this decision. Now though, she was offering to have sex for money which would make her a prostitute. How does a woman who has a moral value to remain a virgin then decide to practice prostitution? And the fact that what she is now doing prostitution is something that she admits. In the article, she says that she knows that selling her virginity is an act of prostitution, that is why she is running the auction out of Nevada. If she had reasons to refrain from sexual behaviour up to know, how does she reconcile becoming a prostitute with her other moral perceptions?

It only gets stranger. It seems that she came up with this idea because she wants to raise money for graduate school in which she wants to study Family and Marriage Counselling. Doesn't it seem that what she is now doing challenges her ability to undertake her desired future profession? She also informed some of her previous boyfriends that they should not think that by undertaking this, she is now becoming promiscuous. No, just a prostitute. How does she understand sexual morality?

Now, of course, one might contend that this issue really has nothing to do with Torah, so why be bothered by it? The fact is that Torah connects to human nature. If God speaks to human beings through the Torah, understanding the frame of reference of the one receiving the communication is significant in understanding the full extent of the communication. I often find that people, in understanding Torah, have uni-dimensional views of human personality and human nature and the result is a simplistic view of Torah. The more that we recognize that the Torah speaks to a multitude of human personality types with variant frames of reference, the more we can see the full depth of the spectrum of Torah. That is why this case is so interesting to me. In attempting to understand the general guidelines of the Torah in sexual conduct with often apply certain perspectives on sexuality and natural morality. This woman would seem to defy these perspectives. She does not seem to fit into any stereotype. Maybe understanding this will open our minds to better understand the Torah perspective on these matters. We can have a clearer idea of the multi-dimensional nature of the Torah directives regarding human sexuality.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

The New Jewish Issue in Washington

As Barack Obama assumes the Presidency of the U.S., it seems that many Jews have important and integral roles within this new administration. According to something I heard tonight, it even seems that of the seven most influential positions in this new administration, all seven have been filled with Jews. I am not sure how to respond to this fact. On one hand, there is pride in hearing of Jews attaining such types of positions. There is also gratitude and hope with the belief that Jewish People now have many friends in the White House, many members of our people in leading positions. There is, however, also some trepidation. Just because someone is identified as a Jew or even calls himself/herself a Jew, does not mean that he/she has the emotions of a Jew and cares about the Jewish People. In this case, though, amongst these new appointees, there are clearly some that strongly identify as Jews, who seem to care about the Jewish People. The problem for me, though, is not whether someone feels like a Jew but rather whether that person thinks like a Jew. In this regard, does this person turn to Jewish sources in making a decision or does the person simply do what so many Jews do -- act upon their own moral initiative and call it Jewish because they can find some source in the large corpus of Jewish sources that can be used to support such an initiative -- and, in any event, their Jewish heart just feels that its right?

Torah is so broad and multi-dimensional that one can almost always find some statement that can be used to support, even advocate for, some viewpoint. The question in Torah scholarship is not whether some source can be found to support an idea but how this source connects to and integrates with the myriad other sources on the subject -- often, seemingly, in contradiction -- to create a substantive, practical directive that reflects the true complexity of a matter. When I hear that a Jew, with a strong, positive feeling of Jewish identity, is in a position of governmental import, I generally do feel some good about it. This positive feeling should result in some positive feelings towards the Jewish People within that administration. But what I am really hoping for when I hear that a Jew is in such a position, is that this Jew is also a Jew who thinks like a Jew. This means someone who understands the nature of Torah and its lessons -- and thus recognizes the complexity of life and of decisions. Such a person I can also trust with the decision making that accompanies such a governmental position -- since such a person will also understand the value of Torah in identifying and clarifying the complexity of a situation and directing a person in proper responses to that situation. The result will be, not just a Jew in government but also Jewish decisions, decisions that reflect Jewish, Torah wisdom. That is, by definition, good for the Jewish People but it is, also, inherently good for all.

The greatest possible kiddush Hashem that can emerge from so many Jews in important positions in this new administration is that wise decisions will emerge from them and people will recognize the value in Jewish, i.e. Torah, thought. Sadly, a chilul Hashem, could also potentially emerge if these Jews actually make foolish decisions which are then interpreted as Jewish decisions because they were made by Jews even though the wisdom of Torah was not applied in making these decisions. So many Jews in the White House -- what to think? It depends. Will these Jews use Jewish wisdom in arriving at their decisions? If the answer to that question is yes -- it is good for the Jews and, in fact, for the U.S. and all Americans, in fact all the world. The wisdom of Torah will be available to assist in the development of the world. If these Jews, though, do not know Torah or how to apply it within their new roles, I have some concerns. They will make their decisions like everyone else but these decisions will still be defined as Jewish decisions. That is taking a gamble.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

A Chumrah becomes a Kullah - A Basic Halachic Warning Signal

Throughout the study of Halacha, one idea that is constantly stressed in the recognition that what may be a stringent position in one case may also result in a lenient position in another case. This recognition is deemed to be most important in halachic analysis for it warns the one doing the analysis not to simply go with the safest position but to strive for the truth -- for the safe position in one case, i.e. the stringent position, may reflect a halachic concept that will result in a most dangerous and risky conclusion in another case, the lenient position. This warning has significance beyond its practical import. The nature of Halacha always demands a full analysis of the case and the concepts involved. There are no such things as easy or safe answers, in the long run. One must always strive to understand an issue to the best of his(/her) abilities and if the only conclusion one can reach still must recognize divergent views on a subject between leading Torah scholars, one, to be safe, must consider all possibilities. This type of analysis demands of us to go beyond agendas -- to determine the halacha according to the truth.

It is with this caveat in mind that I find myself troubled by the recent case of 29-year-old Yossi Fackenheim who was recently declared not to be Jewish by some individuals in Israel. It seems that Yossi, the son of noted Jewish philosopher Emil Fackenheim, wished to give a get to his wife but when he appeared before the beit din to do this, the beit din asked him about his Jewish identity. He informed them that he was adopted and converted as a baby in an Orthodox beit din in Toronto. He, though, also admitted to not abiding by a halachic lifestyle which resulted in this beit din declaring him not to be Jewish. His conversion, since he did not live a Torah lifestyle, was declared null and void.

The truth is that I have difficulties with that conclusion in strict halachic terms, so I am inherently biased against the beit din's conclusion. Yet, even if there are opinions that may come to the conclusion that the non-observance of a halachic lifestyle may challenge a gerut katan, to act upon this view in this case where there are clearly opinions to the contrary in this case, is a clear violation of the above noted principle. While this court and rabbis may feel that they are being stringent in "protecting" the essence of Jewish identity -- and there clearly is value in connecting Jewish identity to Halacha and Torah -- there are also many possible leniencies, or worse, that must also arise from such a decision. My first concern was that Yossi's wife may, if you take the position that he is a Jew, be left without a get. That would be clearly unacceptable. I then heard that this beit din was instructed by a higher court to arrange the get. So the principle prevailed in this important context. But that was only one of my concerns. Do we not encourage Yossi to still do mitzvot? We also find many places in the gemara a concern for how a halachic decision may affect the definition of marital intercourse and, while this is not an absolute overriding concern, there is a a predisposition not to apply a halachic stance that would define an act of marital intercourse into an act of promiscuity, i.e. not marital intercourse, in this case an act of intercourse between a Jew and a non-Jew. It would seem to me that these rabbis and this beit din came to their conclusion so swiftly that they did not even consider these matters. They let their chumra result in kullahs without considering this issue. This does not say that they would not have came to a similar conclusion even if they would have considered all the differing halachic views. As Rav Moshe Feinstein constantly declared -- the posek must act according to his view of the truth. This result, as much as I may disagree, may have been these rabbis' and this beit din's view of the truth. But if that was so, it would have clearly been shown to be the result of contemplation and consideration. That, from what I have heard, does not seem to be the case. It therefore emerged from agenda. Agenda in Halacha must be approached very gingerly.

Of course, the whole issue of how Israel should deal with conversion given the true nature of Jewishness in our time and the multi-faceted way that people look at being a Jew nowadays, is a most complex issue. What does an Orthodox beit din if someone of the stature of an Emil Fackenheim wishes to convert his newly adopted baby through an Orthodox beit din even though the baby will not be brought up within an observant home? It is a real dilemma. Rabbi Reuven Bulka has a book entitled The Coming Cataclysm which argues for what use to be the norm -- that the Orthodox beit din should convert this baby in order to maintain a level of Jewish unity and unity in Identity. The trend in the Orthodox world, today, though is to be more stringent in the laws of conversion and truly demand, especially in the case of an adult, full observance even though that will result in complexity and confusion in Jewish identity. This, though, is the way the law actually seems to read. There is an issue but beyond the actual issue, if our personal agendas become the overriding consideration than Halacha itself -- there is an even greater problem. That is my concern, beyond the normal problems, with this case.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

New Translation of Shemona Perakim

A new translation of Rambam's Shemona Perakim, with commentary, by Nishma contributor, Rabbi Yaakov Feldman, is now available from Targum Press! For further information, please see http://www.targum.com/product.php?xProd=378.
For a brief picture into Rabbi Feldman and his focus, a short bio of him is available on the Nishma website at http://www.nishma.org/nishmaauthors.html. His Nishma article on Tshuva is also available on the website at www.nishma.org/articles/journal/tshuvah.htm
We highly recommend his works.