Since it is now the 100th
anniversary of the Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2017, everyone has been writing
about it. Even a new book came out: The Balfour Declaration: Sixty-Seven
Words, 100 Years of Conflict, by Elliot Jager. I will now add my contribution.
Even though I went to Modern
Orthodox day schools (and many pro-Israel rallies at the UN while attending
Ramaz), I was never taught the story of the creation of the Jewish state. (But
maybe I just wasn’t paying proper attention the one day or week that it was
taught!) Like most people, I thought that Israel was a post-WWII creation by a
world that felt guilty about the Holocaust. I had heard of the Declaration but
had nothing more than a minimal understanding of it. Then about 15 years ago,
while in my forties, I went to a rally and heard Rabbi Shlomo Riskin declare
that the plan for a Jewish State was one of the results of the post-war resolutions
that concluded World War I. I had never heard this interesting idea before. Then
I began to research exactly what he meant. When one realizes that the Jewish
State is essentially a result of the post-war resolutions after WWI, one much
better understands the justice of our cause.
Very
briefly, the background to the creation of the Jewish state is as follows. At
the end of WWI, Britain and its allies defeated the Ottoman Empire and were
willing to give to the Arabs almost all of the vast territories liberated so
they could set up their own states. There was a temporary period with a Mandate
set up so that the new states could be nurtured towards independence by either
Britain or France. This is the story of the creation of Iraq, Syria, and
Lebanon. (As to Arabia, it was too big for a Mandate. Egypt too achieved
independence without a Mandate.) Of these vast territories liberated from the
Ottoman empire, Britain’s plan was to reserve one “small notch,” one to two
percent, to create a region where the Jews could grow into a majority and
gradually set up their own state.
There were no “Palestinian” people at the
time. There were Arabs in Palestine, admittedly many more than there were Jews.
(The Jews were about one sixth of the population.) But Palestine was vastly undeveloped and
underpopulated and there were millions of Jews in Eastern Europe who had no
future there and needed a place to live.) Given that the Arabs were going to
be given vast regions where they could be the majority, they would have no
reasonable grounds to complain that in one tiny area, they would not be the
majority. As Foreign Secretary Balfour wrote in 1919: “Zionism…is rooted in
age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder
import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit
that ancient land.” I.e., world Jewry
had “needs.” We needed one place where we would be a majority. The Arabs
had “desires.” They already had and would now be getting many more places of majority
rule. But they desired to be a majority everywhere. By any sense of
justice, “needs” trump “desires” and it was correct for Britain to attempt this
affirmative action for world Jewry and attempt to carve out one small region
for the Jews to become a majority, given Britain’s generosity to the Arabs in
the other areas.
As one high ranking League of Nations
official put it at the time: “Was not consent to the establishment of a Jewish
National Home in Palestine the price-and a relatively small one- which
the Arabs paid for the liberation of lands extending from the Red Sea to the
borders of Cilicia on the one hand, Iran and the Mediterranean on the other,
for the independence they were now winning or had already won, none of which
they would ever have gained by their own efforts, and for all of which they had
to thank the Allied Powers and particularly the British forces in the Near
East?”
What primarily
motivated the Declaration was Britain’s goal of setting up a state in the area
that would be loyal to Britain. Access to the Suez Canal and the paths to India
were all important to Britain. If Britain could help the Jews become a majority,
Britain would have the loyal state/protectorate in the area that it needed.
With regard to the Arabs in Palestine, to quote one government memo from this
time, “there is no visible indigenous elements out of which a Moslem kingdom of
Palestine can be constructed.” I.e., there was not a sufficiently populated and
organized Arab community there at the time, even though the Arab population in
Palestine at the time outnumbered the Jewish one.
At the time the
Declaration was issued, it was a statement of future policy by the British
government, issued on the eve of their invasion of Palestine. The Prime Minister
at the time was David Lloyd George, and the Foreign Secretary was Arthur James
Balfour. Before it was issued, the declaration had to be approved by a special
War Cabinet composed of Lloyd George and a few other members.
Here is the language of the
Declaration: “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best
endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”
That
the vision of the Declaration was to create a Jewish majority is seen from
the sentence: “it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine…” There was no
reason for that sentence unless the goal was create a Jewish majority. Moreover, Britain would have had no reason to
create a conflicted state in Palestine, one with Jews and Arabs vying for
control. How would that have helped Britain? Critically, the Declaration said
nothing about protecting the “political rights” of the existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine. That was the entire point, to override the political
rights of the Arabs in Palestine, in one small corner of the region. Looking at
the entire picture of the Mideast, this was more than fair, given that Britain
and the Allies were giving the Arabs majority rule throughout 98-99% of the
liberated territories.
The
language of the Declaration was not as explicit as it could have been because
it had to satisfy every member of the War Cabinet, not all of whom shared the
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary’s goals. Also the language needed to be
ambiguous, so it could be reinterpreted if necessary, in the event
circumstances changed.
So if there was
a plan for a Jewish State at the end of WWI, why did it not come into
existence?
Essentially, the Declaration and the period
from 1917-1922 took us from point zero to point 9 on a scale of 1-10, with 10
being the goal of a Jewish State. Indeed after the war, in 1922, the text of
the Declaration was incorporated into Britain’s legal obligation to the League
of Nations. This was approved by 52 nations.
But around this same time in 1922 Britain
issued a “White Paper” and reinterpreted its obligation under the
Declaration. In this White Paper (with different British leaders now running
the government), they suddenly declared that the purpose of the Declaration had
never been to create a Jewish majority in Palestine. Rather, the goal had been
merely to create a national home for the Jewish people within Palestine,
a center that world Jewry could take pride in. They also began to severely
limit the Jewish immigration to Palestine. So even though the Declaration and
its incorporation into Britain’s obligations to the League of Nations took us
to point 9, this 1922 White Paper knocked us a few steps back. It was only with
the UN approval of the Partition Plan in 1947 that we got to point 10 (a state
that we still had to defend with a military victory). Of course, during the
period from 1922-1947, as a result of the Declaration and the period of British
governance under the Mandate, the Jewish population in Palestine grew
significantly and there already was a de facto Jewish State in large areas of
Palestine by the time of the 1947 UN vote legitimizing it.
Even with the reinterpretation in the 1922
White Paper, the ramifications of the
Declaration being incorporated into Britain’s obligations to the League
of Nations is that all Jewish settlement on the entire West Bank up to
the Jordan River was within the area designated for the Jewish national home
with the approval of the League of Nations. (Initially, Britain was even willing
to include a large section east of the Jordan River in the area of the Jewish
State. But by 1922, it was decided that the Balfour Declaration would not apply
east of the Jordan River.)
All rights of
states and peoples granted via the League of Nations are preserved today under
Article 80 of the U.N. Charter. So
today, when Jews settle on the “West Bank,” this is not merely an ancient claim to Biblical lands.
Rather, it is a settlement on lands that were already designated with
international approval for Jewish settlement.
I
would like to close with the inspiring words of Hayyim Nahman Bialik in his
speech at the inauguration of the Hebrew University in 1925: “The Books of
Chronicles, the last of the Scriptures, are not the last in the history of
Israel. To its two small parts there will be added a third, perhaps more
important than the first two...The first two books of Chronicles… end with the
Proclamation of Cyrus…The third will undoubtedly begin with the Proclamation of
Balfour and end with… redemption to the whole of humanity.”
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Mitchell First is an attorney and Jewish history scholar. He can be
reached at MFirstAtty@aol.com