1. Belief in God

This is my first blog. I have little faith in blogs. They’re too easy. Like faith in general. I have little faith in faith.

Should everyone have a right to blog?

Should everyone have a right to believe?

See, here’s the problem: of course everybody else’s blog is self-indulgent and exhibitionist, biased and unoriginal; of course everybody else’s belief system is dysfunctional, fanciful, inarticulate and fragmented. But not mine. My blog is actually worth reading. My belief system is actually believable. I remember when I first heard about blogs, I thought it was a joke. Why would anybody publish his/her diary/journal on the internet? Aren’t diaries those books with the little locks that we used to try to steal from our sisters? Aren’t journals a safe-haven for all our in-process thoughts, the thoughts not yet ready for mass consumption? Isn’t the whole point that nobody else reads it? What I failed to understand is that the blog can offer the best of both worlds. The internet provides the anonymity, if you want it, but allows you to share your thoughts with the world at the same time. More importantly, the underlying assumption is that a blog presents more of a concept-forecast than a finely polished idea—sort of like a weather report. The weather today is sunny, tomorrow looks to be rainy, the next day cloudy, and so on. A blog admits, by its form, to being fallible. Facts can, and often do, go unsubstantiated. The point is not to get locked into anything. If you disagree with me tomorrow about this blog I’ll just say, “Well, that was yesterday’s blog. Read today’s blog.” There’s always that backdoor. The glowing, red Exit sign. “I thought you were a Man of Faith?” “No, not anymore. That was yesterday.” Of course I’m not saying that you have to make a decision and stick with it regardless of what happens. That would be inflexible and foolish. But think about the difference between writing a book and writing a blog: If you decide to write a book, you’re committing to something. If you’re that guy who says, “I want to write a book about the flying patterns of African birds,” you better be sure that that’s going to keep your interest. Write a blog about African birds? Why not? Who cares? How much time are you putting into it? Who’s going to read it? How much research are you going to do for this one post? And tomorrow, when you wake up and you read over the blog and find yourself falling asleep from the monotony of it, do you know what you do? You write about that—you write about how boring African birds are and, what’s more, you write about how boring you were yesterday and thank God you’re not the person you were yesterday because that person would have put you to sleep. That’s what you write about today. And tomorrow? Like the weather forecast, it’s an educated prediction—there’s no real way to know. But if you’re writing a book on the subject you know exactly what you’re doing tomorrow: you’re studying the Wilba Bird in its natural African habitat because you’ve already invested four years into this project and, as disinterested as you are in the topic at present, you persevere. You persevere until you’re finished. Or until that moment when you realize that this is contrary to your very essence and “I don’t care about all the time and effort I’ve put into the thing, I’m losing myself here!” But it’s not just one blog you’re dismissing—it’s years of sweat and bruises and headaches and sleepless nights. When you walk away from that, you walk away with an understanding of yourself that exceeds what you knew of yourself before.

And, no, I don’t know if there’s really such a thing as a Wilba bird. See my point?

The blog is the constant check-up, the minute-by-minute report of Life as we know it. Would any doctor condone daily check-ups? We’d always be at the doctor: there would be no time to get sick; meaning, there would be no time to live. Think of the weatherman who says, “It’s a beautiful sunny day outside,” but hasn’t had the opportunity to see it for himself. One day, he says, “It’s a blizzard out there,” but it’s not snowing. He doesn’t know because he never goes outside. So if you’d ask him, “Do you believe it’s snowing?” he’d say, “Yes.” But if you waited long enough, he’d get an updated report and he’d change his answer: “This just in: it is not snowing.” Like that, fifteen inches of snow disappear from his consciousness. What’s the trick? We’re designed to react, to be moving, growing, bettering ourselves. Maybe it turns out it was a joke, orchestrated by some coworkers to prove how disconnected the weatherman is from the outside world: so now they tell him, “Of course it’s snowing—everybody can see that!” And suddenly, fifteen inches of snow reappear and he’s back on: “Sorry for the confusion, folks.”

Belief is malleable, constantly adapting to the world. Such is essential to our survival. If your joints don’t bend, you’re stuck where you are. The same is true of belief. But, following through with the metaphor, if your joints can’t lock into place, if they’re always swinging and buckling under your weight, you’re also stuck. It’s the interaction of commitment and flexibility that allows for growth. You don’t have to love, or even like, the African birds every day that you’re working there, but you still have to catalogue their habits. Blogging provides for too much flexibility, as does belief. Maybe I’ll wake up tomorrow morning and be an atheist. Or the next day, a Buddhist. Maybe a week from now I realize that I believe in religious chocolate consumption. And then I post my most current beliefs on my blog. Wouldn’t it be more productive to treat belief like a check-up? Annually, or maybe bi-annually, you sit down and really think about what you believe in, what you don’t believe in, how your beliefs have developed over time; think about the weaknesses in your belief-system, the contradictions, the inadequacies; think about your own strengths and weaknesses and how they play a role in your beliefs; think about your ability to manipulate yourself—ask, “Why do I want to believe in this?” But to do this every second of every day?

So God says, “Yes: every second, every day.” How? How without making a mockery of faith? Because it’s a command—it is included within the directive, not external to it. So what is the driving belief that predates all action? Us. We, each of us, we are the lifelong projects. Before belief in God, there must be belief in Self. This means a commitment to growth over time. But there is no commandment in the Torah to believe in Self. To reconsider this belief daily would be destructive. Once we’ve established that we will not examine belief in Self more than once or twice a year, we have room to grow (or fail). The first step? Belief in God, examined and considered constantly in the true pursuit of understanding His commandments. But it is not voluntary. Your belief in Self has led you here; now you are obligated to believe in God. You’ll have your opportunity to reconsider when you reconsider the specifics of your faith in yourself. For now, belief in God is commanded.

At least that’s what I’m thinking today.

The Palin Paradox

Much has been written regarding Bristol Palin, the unmarried, teenage, pregnant daughter of Gov. Sarah Palin, an individuals who, aside from being pro-life, also promotes sexual abstinence outside of marriage. In one way, Bristol's decision to keep the child is seen as a vindication of her mother's values but in another way her actions also are a challenge to her mother's values. Nishma's Founding Director, Rabbi Benjamin Hecht, though, considers another aspect of this issue -- the family dynamics -- both wondering how Bristol told her parents about the preganancy and valuing the parents' response. An article on this subject, by Rabbi Hecht, was recently published in the Jewish Tribune (Toronto).

To view the article on line, go to
http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/content/view/1035/53/

Hearing Both Sides

I recently saw an article on Ynet regarding a charedi woman who was suing a cell phone company in Israel for a breach of privacy. According to this article, the cell phone company gave this woman's husband a list of her calls thus breaching her privacy. The result for the woman was quite detrimental for the list showed that she was calling a certain man quite often and with this information the husband went to beit din to request a get and a favourable divorce settlement which he received. The woman maintained that the relationship she had with this man she was calling was, in fact, quite platonic and was actually for the purposes of gaining insight into how to protect her marriage which was having some difficulties. The result of all this was that the woman not only became divorced but was also ostracized from the charedi community thus she lost her social life, her married life, and her children, for which she maintained custody, were to a large extent abandoned by their father. The woman maintains that under the privacy guarantees which were built into the contract with the phone company, the company was negligible for giving her husband the information about the calls. It seems that the husband got the information by telling the phone company representative that his wife was in labour and needed this information. The woman maintains that there was even a password on the account and the phone company had no right to give this information without the password.

There are further details but upon reading the article one becomes enraged with the phone company for releasing this information to the husband and causing such grief to this woman. One also becomes enraged with the charedi community for treating this woman in this way and supporting the husband's treatment of her, in fact even fostering this treatment. Then, upon reflection, one recognizes that one has only heard one side of the story. The newspaper has presented the story from the perspective of the woman. We do not hear the phone company's side, although the article does state that the company has stated that they are a law abiding company and would never violate the privacy rules within their company. Still, we do not really encounter both sides. The husband is also not given a voice. One may wonder whether under the laws of loshon hara such reporting is even appropriate but one can see the way people are manipulated by the way a story is presented and its onesidedness. At first one takes the presentation for granted as true. Only afterwards does one consider that one has only heard one side of the story.

Then there is the very dynamics of the story. This woman was involved in a behaviour that would be frowned upon by the charedi community. She knew this so why is she now upset with the consequences of her actions by this community. I am not defending the charedi position. I am completely against many of the charedi policies that are instrumental within this story -- the problem with women talking to men; the invasion of privacy that, according to this report, the beit din accepted; the treatment of the woman in the get/divorce proceedings -- but I am not a member of this community. In fact, to some extent, these are reasons why I am not. I, though, have difficulty understanding a person choosing to be part of this community and then being upset when the community simply follows its rules, rules that the woman knew about. If you don't like being part of the charedi world, don't be part of it. I find it problematic when someone acts as a member of that community then also acts in clandestine ways contrary to the community, then is upset when the community finds out and takes action pursuant to its rules. On the grander scale, that is not the way to fight what you believe to be wrong in the first place.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Noach: The Question of Dual Moralities

Originally published 10/31/08, 2:13 PM.
From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Noach and the topic is dual moralities. Some believe that the difference between the 613 mitzvot incumbent on a Jew and the 7 mitzvot incumbent on a non-Jew is simply 606 mitzvot. There are many problems with such an understanding. One is the very fact that there are actual differences in the two Codes with, it would seem, distinct moral directives. For a further discussion on this idea, see http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5758-01.htm.

Why do we celebrate Simchat Torah on Shemini Atzeret?

The day we refer to as Simchat Torah in the Diaspora is actually the second day of the holiday of Shemini Atzeret so the question can be asked, both in the Diaspora and in Eretz Yisrael where the celebration of Simchat Torah is on the (only) day of Shemini Atzeret, why do we celebrate this occassion on a day that is already a holiday? In other words, why do we make the siyum of finishing the yearly reading of the Torah on this day? When one considers the idea that we are not to create another occasion of simcha (joy) on a holiday which has its own reason for joy, this question is even more potent. While we can technically argue that the making of a siyum does not technically violate the principle of mixing joys, the underlying thought is still most significant. Why not mark another day with the joy of the siyum of finishing the weekly readings of the Torah? Why specifically make this siyum on Shemini Atzeret?

There are many sides to this question. It may be something you want to ponder that may give you a greater appreciation of the nature of the day.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Jewish Tribune: Discrimination and Evaluation

Balancing the conflicting rights of individuals has now become a hot topic in Canada with discussions even of whether a doctor can refuse to do an abortion or whether this refusal in a violation of the rights of an individual. An article on this broad subject, by Nishma's Founding Director, Rabbi Benjamin Hecht, was recently published in the Jewish Tribune (Toronto). To view the article on line, go to http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/content/view/994/53/

Zman Simchateinu

The Nishma website at www.nishma.org presents various "Hot Topics" regarding important Torah concepts. One of these is simcha which has specfic importance to the holiday of Succot as this is to be the happiest time of the year. We invite you to look at the Nishma Hot Topic on simcha at http://www.nishma.org/hottopics.html#simcha, read the material sited and comment here as you wish.

Tshuvah

From the on-line library at www.nishma.org, in concert with the theme of the day, we invite you to take a look at Tshuvah by Rabbi Yaakov Feldman at http://www.nishma.org/articles/journal/tshuvah.htm

Gmar tov!

Halachic Query: Conjoined Twins

Recently, someone watching The Learning Channel in the United States called me to ask for my opinion on the theoretical halachic consequences that could emerge in regard to the story that they were watching. It seems that the program was about conjoined twins who are only distinguishable from the neck up. In other words, while there were two heads, the rest of the body was shared between them. In regard to marriage and other matters of personal law, what would be the halachic status of such a person or persons if Jewish?

I was able to find clips about these two girls, Abby and Brittany, on YouTube, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFs8TnUX9Fs, as I wanted to see for myself the exact nature of this case. It seems that medically the matter is quite complicated. There are clearly two personalities with two heads sharing what would seem to be one body. Doctors have found, though, that there are also two hearts, two sets of lungs, two stomachs but somehow everything merges so from the colon, there is only one. It would seem to be that there are similar distinctions in the limbs in that each girl controls only one arm but somehow the legs come under one neurological system. One of the clips indicate that the girls are now 16 and are talking about their desires to be mothers. Thus the question: if the girls were Jewish, could they marry? What would Noachide Law say for non-Jews?

There would seem to be some literature on the subject of Siamese twins in general in regard to marriage. In these cases, though, the bodies are much more distinct and, as in the case of the original Siamese twins who married two different women, each one of the twins would have separate relations with their spouses. The basic question would thus be more one of tznuit in that relations would have to happen in the presence of another person, namely the attached other twin. In the case of Abby and Brittany, though, the sexual organs are shared. Could they, thus, marry two different men? The fact is that even marrying one man could be a problem in that a man cannot have relations with his wife's sister. Would this not be similar to the case of a chatzi shifcha chatzi bat chorin with a combined status of being both Abby and Brittany applying to their combined being. The result would thus be that any sexual act would be defined as incest, according to the Halacha, since they are two sisters and the act would thus inherently be defined as having relations with your wife's sister (at the same time as having relations with your wife).

There is a case in T.B. Menachot 37a,b that actually deals with a case of a two-headed boy in regard to the question of pidyon haben, redeeming the first born. The gemara also raises the question as to how the mitzvah of tephillin for the head would be performed. It is unclear if the gemara views such a two-headed person as one person or two. Abby and Brittany are clearly two distinct personalities but the fundamental halachic question must be whether they are seen by Halacha as two distinct beings or one person. The gemara's discussion does not necessarily answer that question. The gemara also seems to imply that such a two-headed person is not really viable and would die soon after birth (not necessarily within 30 days, though). Abby and Brittany clearly do not fit into the gemara's profile and, thus, it may be argued that the gemara's presentation does not apply to them. There are further indications that these two girls are more separate beings than the being described in the gemara given the duality of many of their internal organs. The gemara seems to be indicating that this two-headed person under discussion only has two heads with everything else similar to the case of one individual. Yet, knowledge of whether the boy under discussion in the gemara had two hearts would not really be available to the authors of the gemara.

I thought that, if Abby and Brittany are defined as two persons by Halacha, one possible, halachically permitted way they may be able to have children, if they were Jewish, would be through the application of the law of pilegesh, concubine. There are major commentators, including the Ramo, who permit a pilegesh and I do not believe that the sister of one's pilegesh is forbidden to the man. Thus if this extenuating circumstance came up under Jewish Law there may be a way to let these girls become mothers. But maybe we would still not follow this route as it does challenge some basic general views on marriage. The fundamental question still remains: what is the definition of an independent being?

I don't really have answers to these questions. I am just posing this case as a halachic query for you to think about and comment.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Machnisei Rachamim Apologetics - Reprint

Machnisei Rachamim Apologetics

First posted on the Avodah List

Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 12:45:40 EDT
From: Richard Wolpoe
Subject: Machnisei Rachamim Apologetics

There is a "machlokes" whether or not to recite Machnisei Rachamim. Those in favor probably rely upon tradition that it is ok.

Those who omit it, cite the Rambam's 5th principle of Addressing our Prayers to G-d along and not to agents or angels.

The following post is based upon the premise that Machnisei is OK to recite, while still respecting the Rambam's premise. Moreover we can appreciate the elegance of a poem w/o necessarily being offended not buying into its apparent premise.

There is an old joke about 2 litigants coming to a rabbi to decide their dispute. Litigant #1 recites his side and the rabbi answers:" You know you're right." Then litigant #2 recites his counter-complaints and to him the rabbis also responds You know you're right." The rebbetzin overhearing this asks: "how can they BOTH be right?". To which the rabbi answers "You know you're right too!"

In this spirit I will endeavor to make both sides right. You might quibble with some specifics, nevertheless don't dismiss the approach, because it is in the spirit of Eilu v'eilu.

Since we enjoy stories, here is another:

There was a very shy fellow named Abraham who was assigned to address a large audience of about 1,000. With his meek voice, he was unable to be heard. In order to assist him, a fellow named Eliezer was recruited to install and monitor a sound system.

During a practice run, Abraham began speaking w/o the mike. "Speak into the Microphone," advised Eliezer. Before long Eliezer explained the advanced electronics, of how the mike went into a wire into an amp into speakers, etc. So Abraham started saying "Dear Microphone please tell the wire to tell the amp to tell the speakers to tell the audience that...". "No no," advised Eliezer. "when you speak into the mike, all the electronics should be ignored as transparent to the user. Even though you are speaking into a mike, address the audience directly. ONLY the audience should be the subject of your address!"
And so it was. Abraham addressed the audience via the electronic system and things went smoothly.

One day, Eliezer caught he flu and was unable to assist Abraham's broadcast. Feebly, Abraham set up the sound system and did what he could. His address went OK, but it was clear that Eliezer was a wizard at electronics and had been using sophisticated techniques of raising and lowering the volume to make Abraham's speech all the more effective. At the end of Abraham's address, he uttered a prayer that had nothing to do with the content of his speech. Abraham asked, "Please restore Eliezer to health, Please have the mikes and speakers work optimally. Please fine-tune the sound system, etc."

Abraham was not addressing the sound system in order to deliver the CONTENTS of his speech. Rather now Abraham was requesting intercession that the sound system OPTIMIZE the impact of his speech.

Those who recite Machnisei Rachamim are not praying to Agents in terms of a prayer. They are requesting aid and assistance that the prayers get delivered OK. Another example: I might address a package to President Clinton in the White House and as an aside I can tell the postman to be very careful in handling the parcel...

So on one level, Machnisei Rachamim is not objectionable at all, it is not truly a prayer to a "being other than G-d" rather it is just a request that those agents do their tasks well in order to deliver the precious parcel of prayers.

On another level, those who do object to Machnisei Rachamim can rightfully cite that on a plain level, it is phrased as a request to being other than G-d and had no place in a Tefillah, either because of how it is appears as peshat or because the unsophisticated might not get the nuance and distinction made above and therefore it is better omitted.

Machnisei is therefore both OK and objectionable, just on different planes of reference.

Shana Tova
RRW

Rosh Hashanah: Dveikut and Shlaimut

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the Rosh Hashanah, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.
The focus of Rosh Hashanah, of course, would seem to be teshuva, repentance, yet the behaviour of the day would seem to focus on tephilla, prayer. While a connection between the two in the context of the day is understandable -- they are two of the three elements that can avert a negative decree (the other being tzedakah, charity) -- there may be more to this connecton than one may at first think. We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5755-30.htm

9-11 Ramblings

Question: How Come I am posting TODAY? 9-11 was weeks ago?
Answer: Today is the HEBREW Yahrzeit of 9-11 the 23rd of Ellul.

Several Disjointed Ramblings

• In the USA 911 is the Emergency Phone Number. The date indicated the emergency indeed. { a Friend pointed this out to me the day it happened.]
  
  
• In Israel/Europe/Canada the date is 11/9. If you use this to make a flip-flop into Hebrew then the 11th month is Av and 11-9 could indicate Tisha B'av. Kinda weird!
  
  
• When my shul COS was still standing, 2 survivors came to shul to bench gomel. One was a Fire Department EMT from Chinatown which is the 2nd closest station to the World Trade Center. I asked him to address the shul on that Shabbos - the one AFTER 9-11 and preceding Rosh Hashana. {as in 2008, 9/11 was a Tuesday and so was RH] H related the horrors because he saw the first tower minutes after it was hit and he was there in person when the 2nd tower was hit as well as when both towers fell. Although he benched Gomel on that Shabbas but once, he related that he said Sh'ma Yisrael 3 times that morning.
  
  
• Another scary thought. In the viduy of Yom Kippur the 4 methods of capital punishment are listed. Sqilah Sreifa etc. There is a machloqet [a dispute] which is the more sever form of death s'qilah or s'reifa. Concerning 9/11, we were discussing the horror when it occurred to one of us that the victimes were faced with this very morbid choice. I.E. to jump would be death by s'qilah [those executed by s'qilah were eushed off a cliff before they were stoned!] and to remain in the burning inferno was to suffer death by s'reifa. From a Traditional Jewish perspective This brought a very horrific, extreme, morbidity to the nature of the deaths involved. I.E. all those who perished did so by the most extreme forms of death in our lore.
  
  
• Some of the far-sighted victims tried to call their spouses by cell phone before dying in order to prevent their spouses from becoming Agunot. How poignant that must have been!
  
  
• Moreover, those who came late to work that morning due to saying S'lichot were saved. How weird is THAT?

Shana Tova
RRW

Fwd: Dots Missing on Lanu Ulevaneinu

I was leining Mincha in shul last Shabbos and the 11 dots were all missing on Lanu ulevanua...

AFAIK thsi does not make the Torah Pe'sullah, but does anyone know for sure?

Humorous aside:

One of the members of the shul commented " the dots were there but jsut hidden because the passuk starts with Hanistarot"
When I repeated this to another rabbi, he answered but it also says BEFORE the dots: V'haniglot!

--
Kesiva vaChasima Tova
Best Wishes for the New Year 5769
RabbiRichWolpoe@Aol.com

Parshah: Ki Tavo - Arami Oved Avi

Originally published 9/21/08, 1:42 AM.
Why did Chazal choose Arami Oved Avi to illustrate the Central of Exodus in the Haggadah as opposed to - for example - Parshat Bo. There is a Tosefta (Peshachim 10:8) that states: "Those who live the in the city and have nobody to recite Hallel would gather in the shul".

Question: How would you know how to lead a Seder without knowing how to lead Hallel?
Answer It used to be that all farmers, when they brought the Bikurim, the first fruit, would say Arami Oved Avi. So Chazal chose Arami Oved Avi to explain the exodus because every farmer in Israel would be familiar with Arami Oved Avi when they brought the bikkurim to the Beit Hamikdash in Yerushalyim. And therefore,

1. We can understand why Hazal picked this Parsha
2. It also serves to explain how a Leader at the Seder could be familiar with Arami Oved Avi yet still not be familiar with how to conduct the Hallel


RRW
[Using AOL due to technical difficulties]

Gabbai Redemption - Sammy G.

Sammy G. My friend the Gabbai and I had a discussion as follows:

RRW: Sammy I was sorry to see you te victim of abuse a few weeks ago. Do you have any positve or favourable stories to lend?
Sammy G:Yes I do. I think you might like this one
RRW: Go on, pray tell
Sammy: Once I was Gabbai for ma'ariv and I waited for most of the people to finish. An old timer Z'ev called me on the carpet. he said that the Rabbi said to wait ONLY for the first 10 to finish and and no more.
RRW: So what's the good news?
Sammy: days later he apologized and said: After all it was MY show so he should not have 2nd guesed me. At last some consideration.
RRW: I'll say, but why did you not follow the Rabbi's rule?
Sammy: someimtes you need to be flexible. Usually we only have 10-15 people. So to wait for the first 10 is enough. But lets' say ther are 22 people? Am I gooing to wait for ONLY the first 10- and leave a MAJORITY stil saying shmone esrai? Of course, not. So I ws not arguin with the Rabbi Chalilah. Just that his rule was for the typcial case. I made an exceptoin because we had a bigger crowed than usual that night
RRW: I see that it kinda makes sense after all
Sammy G. Exactly. but even though Z'ev did not get the REAL reason, at least he realized that I was doing it for SOME reason and to give me the benfit of the doubt. Z'ev is a real mensch in the end. I wish others could admit their mistakes, or at least see the other side.
RRW: yes, I want to post on this further on re: middos.

Ki Tavo: Free Choice

Originally published 9/19/08, 12:33 PM.
From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.
This week's parsha is Ki Tavo and the topic is free choice. So often, people use the argument of free choice to explain why knowledge of God is not clear -- for it it was, we would not have free choice but would clearly not sin -- and/or to contend that there can be no consequences for our actions -- for if there were, we would not have free choice as, for sure, we would do what is good for us. If one considers the brachot and klalot in the Torah, though, one must recognize that free choice exists even when knowledge of God is absolute and the recognition of the consequences of one's actions, even the punishment for sins, is clear and accepted. We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5757-18.htm

Self and Torah

In my latest Commentary article, Footsteps - Chanoch L'Na'ar Al Pi Darcho - which can be accessed through the home page on the Nishma website, www.nishma.org -- in discussing the movement of individuals out of the Charedi community, I raised the issue of the relationship between human nature and the observance of Torah. The resulting bottom line question would be whether the observance of Torah is suppose to result in one being happy.

If one assumes that human nature is dominated by the drives that generally result in not abiding by Torah and if we define happiness as a consequence of the satisfaction of our human nature, then we can say that observing Torah will not generally make us happy. If, on the other hand, we maintain that human nature is actually more in line with the drives that are connected with the observance of Torah, then observing Torah will make people happy. What if, though, human nature cannot so easily be defined? What if aspects of human nature are in the former category and aspects are in the latter? What if, on a more basic level, the two categories are actually very difficult to define.

There are those who maintain that happiness is not necessarily suppose to be a factor in relating to our observance of Torah. We do Torah -- whether it makes us happy or not, whether it is a reflection of our personal nature, is not an important issue. There are those who maintain that Torah, though, is indeed suppose to make us happy, being happy is even a value to search for in our observance of mitzvot. There are, though, two ways of understanding this perception. One is by defining human nature in such a way as yielding a certain form of mitzvah obsevance and arguing that all people, or specifically all Jews, inherently possess this nature. Thus in stating one should be happy in doing mitzvot, one is actually also being told to get in touch with his/her true nature which is the nature that would find happiness in this behaviout. But this may not be the only understanding of how one is to find happiness within Torah observance. Perhaps, in directing people to be happy in observing Torah, they are being directed to bring their self in their observance of Torah.

We can question whether human nature is to connect with Torah or not. If we believe it should -- and thus happiness is a factor in Torah observance -- there are two ways of approaching this directive. One is by believing that just as Torah observance has one standard, all human beings should ideallly have one common nature that is in line with this standard. The belief would thus either be that all people really do have this common nature, they just have to get in touch with it or all people can develop this nature. they just have to change themselves to adopt it -- and the job of someone trying to bring them to this happiness level would be to make them realize and recognize or move toward this common. nature of all people.

But there could be another understanding of the goal of Torah observance being pleasant or resulting in individual happiness. Torah observance is not built on one standard but there are many different ways of bringing Torah observance into fruition. If so, in stating that happiness is a factor to considered in Torah observance, we must bring our personal and distinct human nature, our self, into the analysis of how we should observe Torah. This is, I'll admit, inherently risky and over application of this principle could result in halachic decision making losing its necessary objective base. There is also obviously a role of Torah in refining our natures, our selves, our drives. Yet, if happiness is to be a factor is our observance of Torah, it may not mean that we all have to adopt the same standard and the same nature but what it may really mean is that the Torah does present shivim panim, 70 faces that reflect different paths within Torah, because the unique self of every individual is to fine the path of Torah that is specifically suited to him/her.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Parshah Ki Teitzie 9/11, Amaleik, Honesty and Anti-Semitism

Originally published 9/14/08, 2:24 PM, Eastern Daylight Time.
The juxtaposition of honest weights and measures has been used by Hazal to be a causal connexion.; viz. when Jews are dishonest in business the spectre of Amaleik rears its ugly head. And I have heard similar statements by Holocaust survivors. Supposedly, Anwar Sadat had anti-Semitic feelings due to being ripped off as a youngster by a Jewish businessman.

So be it.

But I would like to suggest as slight nuance shift. The concept that dishonesty in business triggers Anti-Semitism or Amaleik is difficult to perceive. How can the simple act of being dishonest bring about full-fledged persecution?

I would suggest an alternative way of understanding this point. I.E. that there are Latent Anti-Semites all over the place. However, when we Jews behave ourselves we merit Divine Protection. However, when we Misbehave we are stripped of this special shield and we are now VULNERABLE to Amaleik or Anti-Semitism. This might be viewed as a form of negative re-enforcement philosophically speaking; nevertheless in pragmatic and historical terms this can explain how a relatively minor infraction can trigger such a virulent response.

The late Jerry Falwell and other Christian Leaders voiced a similar point of view [POV] with regard to 9-11. and that is normally America merits Divine Protection but for some misbehaviour this Divine Shield was removed. In the case of the Christian Right, that was attributed to Sexual deviance, etc. While the specifc attribution might betray a right-wing or Fundamentalist mindset, the concept of Divine Protection being removed is IMHO indeed a very legitimate Jewish, Midrashic concept. In the case of us Jews, the shield subject to business practices. Woe unto us re: some recent allegations re: some prominent Jewish Businesses.

In the case of America I have no idea which sin was the egregious one that removed this Divine Protection. Perhaps the Christian Right has it right, but it is also possible it has it wrong. If the Dor Hamabbul is a precedent for the world at large, the issue would be "hamas" or a form of thievery - not sexual deviancy. Neverthless. the impact is similar, i.e. that any catastrophe must bring about active introspection and is a call for self-improvement regardless of the specific shortcoming. To put it another way. the Christian Right might have the specific misdeed all wrong but could also be 100% correct that SOME misdeed permitted this plot to succeed and we are therefore impelled to take this as a wake up call.

With thoughts of Elul time Teshuva,
RRW

Ki Teitzei: War and the Innocent Bystander

Originally published 9/12/08, 1:06 PM.
From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.
This week's parsha is Ki Teitzei and the topic is civilain caualties in war. The issue is the concern and treatment of civilians in a battle situation. We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5762-06.html

Ledovid Hashem Ori - Making sense out of Minhag

Forwarded with permission from the Author
to me the issue can be sujmmarized as below

I suppose that one's attitude to this will be a function of one's attitude to minhag in general. Do we follow minhag no matter what, or does it need to make sense to me before I adopt it.

KVChT
RRW

We have been discussing the minhag of reciting l'Dovid Hashem Ori at this time of year, and specifically whether it should be said after mincha or after maariv.

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I think the divergence in minhagim (after mincha vs.after maariv) is linked to the different minhagim with regard to when to daven maariv. In Ashkenaz, where mincha and maariv were davened together before dark, the end of the service was after maariv. Aleinu was not recited between mincha and maariv. Therefore, l'dovid was added after maariv. This also explains why kehillos Ashkenaz blow the shofar after maariv. In our shul, we have both an early and a later maariv, so the shofar is only blown after the first maariv. By contrast, in places where there was a break between mincha and maariv, l'Dovid was recited after mincha. Of course, my analysis does not preclude RYBS's explanation.

It has always occurred to me that the Mishna Berura, who mentions that l'Dovid is recited after mincha, was reflecting the local minhag Polin where he lived. R. YH Henkin and RMB have pointed out the AhS better reflects minhag Lita than the MB.

Another problematic aspect of the custom to say l'Dovid is that the Gra objected to incorporating any extra chapters of Tehillim in davenen other than shir shel yom, and even then, only one shir (eg on RH). Therefore, the Gaon (in accordance with minhag Ashkenaz) did not say mizmor shir chanukas habayis before p’sukei d’zimra. That being said, the same minhag Frankfurt that does not add L’dovid HaShem Ori or Mizmor Shir Chanukas bayis does add a chapter of Tehillim after shacharis (mizmor l’asaf) and others following maariv.

I stopped saying l'Dovid when I was alerted to the Sabbatean origins of the custom to say it at this time of year. R. M Gluck wrote that he will keep saying it because it has become the minhag. I suppose that one's attitude to this will be a function of one's attitude to minhag in general. Do we follow minhag no matter what, or does it need to make sense to me before I adopt it. Of course, there is a middle ground between those two poles. As far as my position is concerned, it depends which day you catch me on.

Kol tuv
Dov Kay

Rabbi Rackman's Hafka'at Kiddushin - a Brief Comment

After a long debate re: the issue - Does Rabbi Rackman [RER] have a right to annul marriages in this day and age?

The Salient question can be summarized as follows:

"Would you, Madam, have agreed to marry this man knowing that he was a "Sarvan-Get?"*

Or IOW assuming no untoward Behavioural changes, this one question would by itself determine a Mikach Ta'ut - an invalid, and therebyvoidable transaction retroactively - at least from RER's perspective.

Many of us - including myslef -would quibble with such a radical, non-Traditional application of such principles w/o solid Rabbinical Precedent, but, truth be told this position is not as radical as many others that have been advocated in Halachic writings.

* - A man who refuses to give a Get when ordered or to appear before a Beth Din to submit to their psaq.


KT,
RRW

Some Contradictions - Introducing Shloyme

Dear Bloggers,

Amongst my Chevra is a young man named Shloyme who went through the standard MO day School system and then learnt in Israel for several years. Being a highly unique individual he is filled with questions. For some reaons, he has noticed both writings and is obsessed with seeing things as consistent. He probably learned a lot of Tosafos! Anyway he has engaged me in a few discussion and I am at liberty to share them with you becuase Shloyme is not his real name anyway.

Shloyme: I don't get it, isn't the Rav the last word at YU?
RRW: no not necessarily so. They did NOT folow all of his minhaggim at YU when I was there.
Shloyme: But I read in the YU papaers that they did NOT allow Stern to have women lein Megillah for other women because it was against the Rav's p'saq.
RRW: Yes I saw that, too
Shloyme: But Rav Shachter set up an Eruv at YU even though the Rav was opposed to an Eruv there or anyewher in Manhattan as far as I know.
RRW: That is true, what's your point Shloyme?
Shloyme: My point is: when it comes to women NOT leining Megillah, the Rav trumps all of the posqim who DO allow a woman to lein for other owman [see list in Beis Ysoef]. But when it comes to s'fiek Hillul Shabbos, the Rav's Humros are set aside and he is ignored, and poof, up goes the Eruv!
RRW: yes, Indeed one of hte Rav's talmiddim [since deceased] once bemoaned this to me in the Breuer Sukkah how the Rav is "rolling in his grave" about the way his opinions were ignored re: the Eruv. That said, I am really not too familiar with Eruvin to make any comment. BEH I will be spending some time learning more about ERuvin in 5769. *
Shloyme: And re: hilchos Megillah? What is your position there?
RRW: Well I DID researxch this and I read the definite scholarly article by Rabbi Avi Weiss years ago. My take is as follows

• Rishonim: the dispute is women leingin for men. All Rishonim allow women to lein for women [see Aforementioned Beis yosef]
• Acharonim: All of a sudden NEW humros abound and the argument morphed to women cannot lein for men at all and it is NOW a machlokes about women leiningn for women!

Shloyme: Nu, so what changed?
RRW: I am not sure. There are a LOT of changes that Acharaonim have made to Halachah and Minhag and many of them seems strange to me. But to be fair, I've been told that the Rishonim changed a lot from the Ga'onim, too.
Shloyme: and So bottom line, what is your position re: a woman leing for a woman?
RRW: I see no problem. I saw the Rav's postion following the Magein Avraham but - since the RAv is a GRAnick - I am surprised that the Rav went into that direction and did not stick closer to the simple Talmudic texts which are far more ligberal. It kinda surprises me, to tell you the truth. I guess I see a bit of inconsistency here after all. Sh'koach Shloyme!

KT
RRW

Shoftim: The False Prophet

Originally published 9/5/08, 9:57 AM.
From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Shoftim and the topic is the the navi sheker, the false prophet. The issue is not solely the person who lies about speaking in the name of God but the issue is also the message. The issue concerns any distortion of Torah. We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5756-22.html

The Palin Pregnancy

Sarah Palin, the soon-to-be Republican candidate for Vice-President of the U.S., was chosen by John McCain supposedly to secure the more conservative elements of the party. She is described as a social conservative; one who has adopted and represents the more right wing positions on social ethics and morality. In other words, she is for family values and pro-life. It is within this background that the announcement of her unmarried teenage daughter's pregnancy is most interesting -- and may actually bring out a most interesting Torah perception.

The fact that Bristol Palin is both pregnant and will keep the baby presents a most interesting contradiction in the moral workings of what we may term "social conservatives." On one hand, she is a teenager pregnant out of wedlock. What does that say about her values? What does that say about her parents and how they raised her? This would seem to be a black mark against Gov. Palin -- her own teenage daughter has had sex. Yet watch what is happening to temper this and even turn it around to be a moral example for this political group. First, she is going to marry the father. What does that say? Well it says that, at least, her sexual encounter was not fully promiscuous, i.e. that she sleeps around. If she is going to marry the father, we can assume that there is a relationship -- and while that doesn't justify pre-marital relations, even to people in the right wing, it does temper it. But that is not the real point. The fact is that she is going to keep the baby. She is an example of pro-choice -- and now becomes an example of Gov. Palin's values.

In keeping the baby, Bristol Palin becomes a living example of the values of pro-life and an example of what her mother believes. She now becomes an example of proper upbringing, of being taught proper values. The Palin family now also becomes an example of what a family must do to ensure that a pregnant daughter keeps the baby. All the right things are being said. Of course it will be hard on the family, but this is what a loving family must do. Of course it will be hard on the daughter but doing the right thing can be hard -- and that is why it is most important for the family to stand with their daughter...and not chastise her for having had sex. The Bristol Palin pregnancy now becomes an example of pro-life. And watch the challenges of pro-choice advocates. Doesn't pro choice also mean respecting and supporting a woman who does decide to keep the baby?

So what would have seemed to be a moral black mark against Gov. Palin, now becomes a potential moral example. She is pro-life and is willing to accept the responsibilities that go with this opinion. The problem is that she is Catholic -- a devout Catholic from what I read -- so the fact that her teenage daughter slept with her boyfriend still does raise some questions. But what I find most interesting is that what is playing out is actually the moral standards that the Torah decries for non-Jews. There is no issur for Noahides to have pre-marital sex so from a Torah perspective there was nothing wrong with Bristol McCain having had sex. There is, though, a major issur for Noahides to have an abortion. For Noahides, abortion is clearly a category of murder. So Briston Palin keeping the baby is what the Torah would demand of her. What we are thus seeing in this life drama to observance of the Sheva Mitzvot Bnei Noach. The problem may be that the Palins don't even know that, and thus we can still wonder about what all these events mean about the value structure within the Palin home in terms of how Bristol Palin incorporated the values of her parents and how these values were imparted to her. How a child acts does not necessarily tell us about the parents but often it does. Bristol Palin presents a contradiction - which is often the case. What does that say about Gov. Palin, if anything?

Of course, Gov. Palin's response to Bristol's pregnancy, regardless of how she feels about Bristol having had sex, let's the nation evaluate her in terms of her behaviour -- and that will be part of the upcoming campaign, no doubt. But it is most interesting how we should look at all the events from our perspective, the Torah perspective. In the end, what is occurring is the observance of the Noahide Code to its full extent. There was nothing wrong with Bristol being pregnant from a halachic perspective. And again from a halachic perspective she is doing the right thing in keeping the baby. She is following the Sheva Mitzvot, period-- and her family is helping her do that even if they don't really know that. I find this most interesting.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Dear Bloggers
This is the fruit of a Debate on the Avodah list. Contemplate and enjoy!
Shavua Tov and Chodesh Tov
RRW

[Please excuse the formating!}
Ask yourself the following questions and contemplate their implications:
1. Based upon Torah Principles:
a. Do we want a subjective or objective ps’aq?
b. Avos: Ein Dan yechid ela Echad.
c. Does not the Halacha in Tur/SA 25 refelct the need for the possibility of a To’eh bidvar Mishnah?
d. Given circular approval of Posqim [i.e. since the poseiq says it it MUST be OK!] then how can we have a to’eh bidvar Mishnah? A poseiq is ALWAYS right because he combines sniffim to make himself correct regardless of Meqoros
e. The Torah and Maseches Horyos demands the possibility of a Sanhedrin that is mistaken. How can that EVER be - with Posqim whose sniffim and Heruistics automagically make them right?

2. From a s’vara point of view:
a. Do you prefer a Poseiq to subscribe to principles
OR
b. Do you prefer submitting to a poseiq who makes subjective decisions based upon his feelings w/o regard to objective criteria or cherished precedent?
c. Do you prefer a Poseiq who lords himself OVER the Halachah and goes where he feels his Predetermined heuristics bring him?
OR
d. Do you prefer a poseiq to say with the modesty of a Rema to say: “Well, my conclusion is really X but I defer to Y because it has been established or he is greater etc”
OR IOW:
e. Do we want a system of LAWS?
OR
f. A system of men? Certainly RMF welcomed people to dispute his conclusions. Why are “ketannim” - instead of “gedolim” opposed to this?

3. Re: Rackman and Agunos
a. See YD 98. What is the ONE CASE in SHAS and POSQIM that Meisi’ach Lefi Sumo is believed on a D’orraiso level?. [note, it sure ain’t issur v’heter!]
b. Given Hazal’s disregard to rules of Kosher eidus, does this set a precedent for disregarding OTHER principles in the same sugya?
c. Have I ever Personally endorsed R. E. Rackman’s P’sak?
d. HOW IS it specifically that RER”s shita is mor eradical than what is often found in Teshuvos nowadays?

4. Re: Algorithimics
a. In which post did I ever propose an algorithmic solution to p’sak/
b. Is this not a simple straw man to make me “wrong” or IOW accuse Wolpoe of subscriping Alogithimics then attack that position and totally ignore Wolpoe’s actually stated points?
c. If Algorithmics is off-limits please describe the techniques ascribed to:
i. Rif [yes the Rif followed VERY strict rules of p’sak]
ii. SA [BD of Rif/Rambam/Rosh]
iii. Rema [What’s accept by consensus in Asheknaz based upon a finited list of posqim]
iv. SMA [viz. see Choshen Mishpat 25, we always follow RIF except when Tsoafos Argues]
v. Kitzur SA [BD of Chayei Adam, SA harav and Derch hachai’m,]
d. Search or scan the Major Posqim – Tur, BY, SA, Rema, MB Ahs Etc,.
i. Do they frequently use terms as sniffim to build a case?
OR
ii. Do they use terms like Rov Posqim, Rov Acahronim , Maskanas Haposqim etc.[e.g. see Maggid Mishneh Rambam Hilchos Shabbas 5:1]

5. Re: eilu v’eilu
a. Since both BS and BH are Ielu V’eilu then can we apsken EITHER way
OR
b. Does it simpley man that both are valid Torah in a limud sense but p’saq is only ONE way
c. Can RE Racman therefore be a valid opinion EVEN if rejected lema’aseh or is ho objectivlye worse then Beis Shammai. And if so, do we have a bas Kol to Says so

6. Re: Acceptablity
a. IF posqim are right simply because they are popular than how is that ANY different than schectherian Cahtolic Israel?
b. And if Accepted Psaq is ALWAYS right how could the GRA ever oppose it? Or the Rav? Etc.
c. Does the majoprity of Posqim trump the majority of amcha?
OR
d. Vice versa
e. 

7. Re: Attacking certain O Teshuvos
a. Do you think that cricisizing O teshuvos that lack Obejctivity a DEFENSE of C teshbuvos
OR
b. Do you think that given that C teshuvos are Flawed, nevertheless some O teshuvos are equally flawed and so thy should ALSO be criticized.
OR
c. Do you think all C teshuovs are ipso facto flawed and all O TEshuvos are ipso facto wonderful! And that therefore we should attack a C teshuvo even if it calls for decorum in Shul and defend an O teshuva even if it leads to “krum “halachic priniciples, just because WHO says it?

Re'eh: To'eva

Originally published 8/29/08, 6:20 PM.
From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Re'eh and the topic is the the term to'evah, usually translated as abomination. The term is often used by proponents of different ethical perspectives as a further indication of the significance of their ethical stance. The fact is, though, that the use of this term in the chumash itself may not actually provide support for such asserions. We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5754-27.htm.

Welcome Back from Beijing and Come 'on Baby Light my Fire!

Dear Readers:

I have "officially" returned from Beijing and the Olympics!

You mean YOU were in Beijing AT the Olympics?
Well yes and no.
What do you mean by yes and no?
Well I was in A Kosher Chinese Restaurant during ALL of my working hours
and WATCHING the Olympics on TV during my spare time!
You mean to say this restaurant is IN Beijing?
Not exactly, but most of the people that work there ARE from the People's Republic of China and DO speak Mandrain!

OK now that we have learned not to take things TOO liberally.
Liberally? you mean literally!
Yes, that too!.

Here is some Olympic/Chinese/Mashgiach Humor.

Mashigach: [to Chinese Restaurant owner] Did you see how that they began the Olympics by lighting the Olympic torch?
Owner: Yes I saw it on TV. It was quite a display!
Masjhgiach: Did they have their Mashgiach light the fire in Beijing OLympics, too? [just like here at the restaurant?]
Owner: LOL [Laughing Out Loud]



--
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com

Beyond Hekhsher Tzedek

The aftermath of the Rubashkin affair has brought about a call for ethical considerations to be included in hekhshers given to companies for the observance of kashrut. The call is that it is not enough to sanction purchasing from a company simply based upon the observance of the narrow laws of kashrut but rather this sanction should include a declaration that this company also observes other ethical laws that define it as a exemplary corporate citizen.

There has been many responses to this call. One is that kashrut certification is, and should be, exactly that -- a certification regarding the specific laws of kashrut. Rabbi Aaron Levine, though, in article in the Jewish Press which can be found at
http://www.jewishpress.com/content.cfm?sid=13&contentid=20737 presents a fundamental problem, though, with this concept in terms of its practical applicability. Rabbi Levine's words can be applied to much of Torah in general. There are certain halachot which are defined solely in practice. Whether a piece of meat is kosher or not is clearly definable in a set manner -- albeit there may be disagreements in the yardsticks to be applied in this set manner. You can clearly state, based on the facts alone, whether a piece of meat is kosher or not pursuant to a certain halachic standard. In the case of matters of tzedek though, all you can pass on to the person is the methods of evaluation but you cannot clearly state the conclusion in practice that needs to be specifically applied. In regard to these types of halachot you can't fully legislated specific behaviour because the specific facts of the case may demand a different evaluation. If one thinks about this, this concept can explain why ritual law dominates Orthodox Jewish mindsets rather than ethical law. People like to be told specifically what to do. Ethical laws within Torah can only teach methodology -- actual practice has to be determined in a case by case manner.

This, according to Rabbi Levine, is what would make a hekhsher tzedek very unwieldy to administrate although in principle it may be a good idea. It is, in my opinion, also why people in studying and observing Torah stress the ritual over the ethical. The former can have clear dos and don'ts. The ethical demands an evaluation in every case dependent on the rules of Torah. That calls upon us to think on the moment and accept the responsibility for our decision. And that is something we often shy away from

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Initially Yours

OK: below plz find sum commonly abbreviated cyber-terms. I.E. people get confused by terms e.g. "FWIW" so I thought it would be a good idea to get it a list started WRT these terms.

FWIW - For what It's Worth
IIRC - If I recall correctly
AFAIK - As far as I know
IMHO -- In my Humble [hubris?] opinion
AIUI - As I understand it
AISI - As I see it
OTOH - On the Other Hand - or sometimes on the ONE Hand [e.g. when used in pairs]
WRT - With Regard To

Some Jewish/Hebrew ones:

KT- Kol Tuv
TSBP - Torah She'b'al Peh
RWO - Right Wing Orthodox
LWO - Left Wing Orthodox
O - Orthodox
C- Conservative
R- Reform
O/C/R - [obvious from above]
LFAD - lefi aniyat da'ati [see AISI or AFAIK above]
HLMM - Halachah Lemoshe MiSinai
OBM - Of Blessed Memory
IM - Igrot[s] Moshe
MB - Mishna Brura
SA - Shulchan Aruch
BY - Bet Yosef
AhS - Aruch Hashulchan

Some Famous Jewish Personalities

RYDS - R Yosef Dov Soloveichik
ROY - Rav Ovadiah Yosef
RMF - Rav Moshe Feinstein

I plan to add to the list on as as needed basis.

KT,
RRW

The Ethical Rift

Fifty years ago, being frum meant basically that you had the same ethical standards as the general population but that you were more committed to what people called the ritual laws of Judaism (Shabbat, kashrut) and expected to be more scrupulous in observing these generally accepted ethical and moral standards (although the general population loved to find frum people who did not meet these standards).

Today, though, it has changed. Being frum now often means to be at odds with many moral and ethical views that are becoming more accepted. From gay rights to women's rights to abortion to euthanasia and so on, the world is in flux over many ethical and moral issues. It can no longer be said that there is even one generally accepted moral standard in the general population so for sure it cannot be assumed that frum individuals share basic ethical outlooks with the general population. The question is: how does this impact on our presentation of Torah? Does everything now become a chok even as we feel it is a mishpat?

The strangest problem, though, may be that those I, for example, side with in many conclusions are not necessarily the ones I side with in general outlook, even in general ethical/moral outlook and those with whom I disagree may also be the ones that I find more like me in general outlook. For example, I clearly am disgusted by the way the Taliban and other extremists treat an adulterer and, especially, an adulteress but in attacking such people I find myself joining with those who don't even think adultery is that wrong if wrong at all. And I express my views on adultery, I am, furthermore, almost immediately categorized with the Taliban. That is especially true in the matter of gay rights. If I express any opposition to homosexuality based upon my religious principles, I am branded as homophobic and racist.

I wonder where this will all take us in the future as I believe we are entering into a new dynamic in relating to the world.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

V'etchanan: Yashar and Tov

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is V'etchanan and the topic is the the terms yashar and tov, specifically the source of ethics. In our ethical behaviour, do we search solely for Divine approval or is there a value in human approval? We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5754-40.htm

Reflections on The 3-week Season

Something to Ponder! FWIW I heard a great lecture on this Sugya.

KT, RRW

Time for courage

By Shammai Engelmayer

(C) 2002 - all rights reserved by the author

An Orthodox colleague approached me recently with a request. The Three Weeks are about to begin, he said; perhaps it is time to reprise a column I wrote over four years ago.

The Three Weeks, of course, is that period between the Fast of Shiva Asar b’Tammuz (17^th of Tammuz) and Tisha B’Av (9^th of Av) that is marked by an escalating level of mourning for the sacking of Jerusalem and the razing of the Temple both in 586 BCE and 70 CE. This year, that period began on Thursday (June 27) and will end well after 9 p.m. on July 18.

The column in question had to do with why Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE. Of specific interest to my colleague was not the story itself, but the lesson it taught for future generations. The recent UJA-Federation study of Bergen County Jewish life, my colleague said, is not the triumphant document of vibrant Jewish life that it is being made to appear. Its references to the high number of unaffiliated Jews in the county and other statistics, such as the number of Jews under age 35 who have Christmas trees in their homes (it is over 30 percent), only reaffirm that American Jewry is in the midst of a demographic nightmare. American Jewry may disappear entirely in a generation or two, if the horrifying trends continue.

Yet, my Orthodox colleague said, the streams continue to fight among themselves as if there is nothing wrong. The story of why Jerusalem was destroyed, he said, had something to say about that.

What was most interesting (other than that a 4-year-old column had made such an impression on him) was that the story he was referring to usually is cited inaccurately. In fact, we have heard the inaccurate version so many times that we accept it as fact: Jerusalem was destroyed because of the sin of “baseless hatred” (sinat chinam); the Talmud says so, so it must be true.

Actually, the Talmud offers many reasons for why Jerusalem was destroyed by the Roman. In the Babylonian Talmud tractate Shabbat (119b), for example, it offers a laundry list of reasons. Among them are that “Shabbat was desecrated there”; “Jerusalemites neglected reading the Shema”; “neglected [the education of] school children”; acted without concern for how their actions looked to others; acted as though the most ignorant of the law were the equals of those most knowledgeable; “closed their eyes to the evil around them and did nothing to correct the situation”; or “that scholars there were despised by the general population.”

The Jerusalem that these scenarios conjures up was one rampant in secularism and disdain for “the religious.” A picture of another sort is painted in BT Yoma (9b), and it is here that we are given the most popular reason for Jerusalem’s destruction: “But the second Temple -- during which period they occupied themselves with Torah, mitzvot, and gemilut chasadim – why was it destroyed? Because there existed there sinat chinam. That is meant to teach you that baseless hatred is considered even worse [a sin] than the three sins of idolatry, sexual immorality, and bloodshed combined.”

That is strong stuff, but especially since the three sins it outranks are the only ones for which the Talmud insists a person should suffer martyrdom rather than be forced to commit the offense.

What is absent here, however, is an explanation of this “baseless hatred.” For that, another talmudic text, BT Gittin (55b-56a) is usually cited, the infamous tale of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza. There is only one problem with this citation: It has nothing to do with “baseless hatred” and makes no such claim. Those who cite it either have never studied the text, or deliberately cut off the tale at its knees to distort the true message before it reaches the general Jewish public.

“The destruction of Jerusalem came through a certain Kamtza and a Bar Kamtza in this way,” Rabbi Yochanan explains in this section of Gittin. “A certain man had a friend named Kamtza and an enemy named Bar Kamtza. He once made a party and said to his servant, ‘Go and bring me Kamtza.’ The man went and brought him Bar Kamtza instead. When the [host] found [Bar Kamtza] there, he said, ‘Behold, you are the one who tells stories about me. Why are you here? Leave.’ Said [Bar Kamtza to the host]: ‘Since I am already here, let me stay, and I will pay you for whatever I eat and drink.’”

The host said no, and all the efforts of Bar Kamtza to avoid being embarrassed proved futile. He even offered to pay for the whole party, but the host took him by the hand and threw him out, while all of Jerusalem’s elite reportedly stood by in silence.

“Said [Bar Kamtza], ‘Since there were Rabbis sitting there and [they] did not stop him [from behaving so boorishly], I understand from this that they agreed with him. I will go to the [Roman] government and inform on them.’”

Thus, according to the testimony of Bar Kamtza, the reason for his perfidy was the silence of the Rabbis, not the animosity shown to him by the anonymous host. That animosity, in fact, may not have been baseless, at all. The host cites his reason: that Bar Kamtza spread tales about him, presumably of an evil nature. Bar Kamtza does not deny the charge. Rather, he pleads not to be embarrassed in front of Jerusalem’s elite.

The story, however, is not over. Rabbi Yochanan has more to say:

“[Bar Kamtza] went and said to [the local governor, personal representative of] Caesar, ‘The Jews are rebelling against you.’ [The Roman] said, ‘How can I tell?’ Said Bar Kamtza to him: ‘Send them an offering and see whether they will offer it [on the altar].’”

Bar Kamtza, of course, had a plan. He knew that the Romans would choose a perfect calf for the offering. He hoped that he would be the one to take it to the Temple, and he was. “While on the way,” said Rabbi Yochanan, Bar Kamtza “made a blemish on its upper lip, or some say that it was on the white of its eye, in a place where according to our way of thinking it is a blemish [thereby rendering the calf ineligible as a sacrifice], but according to [the Roman] way of looking at it, it is not [considered a blemish].”

Now Rabbi Yochanan gets to his point:

“The Rabbis reasoned that it should be offered, in order to keep peace with the government, but Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to this: ‘They will say [in the future] that blemished animals are offered on the altar.’ [The Rabbis] then suggested that Bar Kamtza be killed so that he could not go and inform against them [a second time], but Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to this, ‘They will say [in the future] that someone who makes a blemish on consecrated animals should be put to death.’”

On both points, apparently, Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas was able to sway the majority to his viewpoint. Said Rabbi Yochanan: “Because of the humility of Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas, our House was destroyed, our Temple burnt and we ourselves exiled from our land.”

We are not certain who this Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas was, because he never again appears (at least by that name) in the entire Talmud, although a Rabbi Zechariah ben Eucolos makes a solo appearance in BT Shabbat in a discussion of how to get rid of the kernels of Syrian dates. The traitorous Jewish historian Josephus, who ascribes the beginning of the war to the refusal to accept the offering of the emperor in 66 C.E., mentions someone with a similar name and says he was an important figure in the rabbinic circles of the day.

Who he is, however, is less important than what Rabbi Yochanan meant by humility. From the context of the story, it is clear that he meant that Rabbi Zechariah refused to bend the law even though refusal to do so could lead to tragic consequences. It is as if he said, “Who am I, a mere human, to change God’s immutable law even this once?”

That is, in fact, how most sources understand Rabbi Yochanan’s use of the word humility (both the English Soncino translation and the Hebrew Steinsaltz translation define it as “stubborness”). For Rashi, the great commentator of the Middle Ages, this was an unacceptable definition, however. In his world – the world of Ashkenaz, the Crusades and the mass murder of Jews – extremism was the route to holiness. When offered the choice of “convert or die,” the Jews of Ashkenaz were instructed to choose death, even at their own hand. Rashi, therefore, offered his own translation of humility: patience. It is not a definition that makes sense in the context of the story, but it was one that suited Rashi’s world view. (This world view is reflected in the ArtScroll translation, which uses the word “tolerance” directly in the text, avoiding “humility” altogether.)

Rabbi Yochanan’s point, however, is clear: Jerusalem was razed and the Temple set afire because one rabbi insisted that God’s law was immutable and uncompromising, and the consequences be damned.

The true lesson of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza, and the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple, is that the consequences must be considered. If God was the ultimate author of the calamities of 70 C.E., then it was God Himself who rejected following a strict interpretation of halachah in the face of impending disaster. It was He who punished His people for not allowing a more liberal interpretation of the law to hold sway long enough to avert disaster.

Sometimes, God was saying, religious authorities must set aside their aversion to compromise. When the fate of the People Israel is at stake, they must be more accepting of other views and must be more honest in admitting that their views may not be the only ones that will please God. They can hold to their views, but they must neither demonize nor delegitimate those who think differently.

Put into the context of the demographic nightmare facing us, which was the point of my colleague’s request, it will take all three streams working together to stem the tide of disaster. Each must revisit its hardened opinions and decisions. Each must find ways to recognize the validity of the other and the usefulness of the other in trying to reawaken Judaism in the hearts of the born-Jewish. Each must set aside its triumphalism and its competitiveness, and sit together in formulating the battle plans for saving the Jewish future.

What was lacking in the Kamtza/Bar Kamtza story was rabbinic courage. The Rabbis at the party did not have the courage to stand up to the anonymous host. They lacked courage again in the face of the stubbornness of Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkilus.

If they lack the courage now, we are doomed.

Comparing the Holocaust and Assimilation

I believe it was Emil Fackenheim who said that we must vigilantly attack assimilation so that we do not give Hitler a posthumous victory. Bluntly, I have always had problems with that argument. I could contend that, in line with this type of argument, assimilation and more specifically intermarriage could be the best way to ensure that Hitler is not posthumously victorious. One of the first laws that the Nazis introduced were the Nuremburg Laws that made intermarriage between an Aryan and a Jew a criminal offense. The essence of Nazism was narrow racism built upon a belief that one person is inherently superior to another. The way to defeat such a concept, it would actually seem, is through the promotion of universalism and the treatment of all human beings as not only equal but inherently the same. Thus, if our sole concern is to defeat Hitler, the call should really not be to encircle ourselves in separate groupings and maintain distinctions between different people and peoples but to promote the common essence of all humanity and universalism. Of course, this is not what I advocate but then again my point in being Jewish is not to prevent Hitler from having a posthumous victory.

I have similar feelings in regard to a comparison between modern assimilation and the Holocaust. Such a comparison, in many ways, seems to me to be solely an attempt to bring the emotions a person feels towards the horror of the Holocaust into one's perception of assimialtion. As with most cases where the word Holocaust is used in comparison to some event, it is often just a marketing tool to try and evoke the passionate response that the user of this term desires. Is it truly comparable, though? The Holocaust was the imposition of one group upon another against the will and desire of those being imposed upon. Assimilation and intermarriage are, on the other hand, the actions of one group, based upon their will and desire, that is not viewed favourably by another person or group. Again, I am not, of course, promoting assimilation. What I am calling for, though, is seeing things honestly.

Of course, Torah calls upon the Jewish people to maintain a separation between us and other peoples; Inherently, there is thereby a challenge to universalism. Of course, Torah calls upon us to fight assimilation and to see the loss of Jewish identity and expression within a person as a tragic event, even if the person has so decided. Inherently there is thereby a challeng to the value of autonomy that is so significant within the realm of liberty. Does this mean Torah is against universalism and liberty? I believe that, of course, the answer to this question is no -- but to clarify the Torah understanding of universalism and nationalism, of imposition and liberty demands much work and effort.

Comparing the Holocaust and assimilation is such an easy thing to do -- and to thereby evoke emotions that would promote Jewish identity. The cost, though, is Jewish thought. The comparison is really inappropriate. There are reasons why the comparison is inappropriate. The comparison ultimately weakens the essence of what Torah really is all about. Such comparisons are used because their easy. Such comparisons, though, ultimately hurt Torah and Jewishness because what God has given us is not easy but demands much thought.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Controverisal Op-ed in the New York Times from the RCA

One quick comment:
If this institution were brought down, prices of Glatt Kosher meet would rocket higher than did Gasoline earlier this year.
KT
RRW

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Dark Meat
By
Shmuel Herzfeld
Washington

ACCORDING to the Jewish calendar we are now in the month of Av, a period of increasingly intense mourning that culminates with a total fast on the Ninth of Av, which this year coincides with Sunday, Aug. 10.

One of the customary practices in these nine days is the avoidance of meat: it's the way we commemorate the destruction of the Temple, where daily animal sacrifices were once brought.

Refraining from food is symbolic, of course. The idea is not just to avoid meat but to limit ourselves so that we can better focus on the spiritual.

Unfortunately, this year kosher meat has become a different type of symbol, one not of mourning and spiritual devotion but of ridicule, embarrassment and hypocrisy. In May in Postville, Iowa, immigration officials raided Agriprocessors Inc., the largest kosher meatpacking plant in the country.

What began as an immigration sting, however, quickly took on larger dimensions. News reports and government documents have described abusive practices at ...

Link to NY Times

--
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/

Principles and Tolerance - Part 2

The second part of a two part presentaion on balancing principles and tolerance, by Nishma's Founding Director, Rabbi Benjamin Hecht, is available in this week's edition of the Jewish Tribune (Toronto). To view the article on line, go to http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/content/view/821/53/

Sinat Chinum

While most may wish to translate sinat chinum as "baseless hatred", I prefer to translate it as "purposeless hatred". It is learning how we are to deal with what we may refer to as our more negative emotions that must be our goal during the Three Weeks.

To understand why I translate sinat chinum in this manner and to further understand the lessons that are to learned through this term, I invite you to read the following articles from the Nishma website:
Defining Sinat Chinum (Part One)
Defining Sinat Chinum (Part Two)

Rabbi Ben Hecht