The specific case is not the issue here. To simplify matters, I took a minority position of a point of view on a Halachic matter. [For the sake of illustration, let's say that I favored saying the brachah of "Al Netilas Yadayim" prior to washing.]
Albert called me on it.
"Wolpoe, you advocate Halachic Consensus! How can you oppose the practice that has been approved by the vast majority? This is inconsistent with your Halachic thesis!"
For a few minutes, I thought Albert had indeed detected an inconsistency, isolated an anomaly!
Then my mind cleared and I realized he overlooked a significant Hilluq, a major caveat.
My position really did not contradict Halachah on the ground - Since I never had publicly advocated my opposition in order for people to alter their practice! Rather I was voicing loyal opposition to the decision rendered by the majority; and am still willing to abide by the consensus position.
Let's take a Parliamentary example.
Scenario:
The Majority Party proposes to require 40 hours of training to earn a driver's license
The Minority Counter-Proposes only 20 hours instead.
And let's say I hold like the minority [the loyal opposition] that counter-proposes the 20 hours.
After the vote [the nimnu v'gamru] the Majority Party wins the vote and the new law has been duly established.
OTOH I loyally abide by the majority proposal as bona fide new law
OTOH in the arena of opinion I still maintain my view that this law is a "bad law"
Albert apparently seems to have missed this distinction! That despite taking an oppositional opinion, I may still allow for deference to the legal process! He seems to be equating opposition in thought to disobedience in deed! But loyal opposition can split this baby! A minority can oppose a decision yet defer to it nevertheless.
This dovetails with the Elu v'Elu [Ev"E] series dealing with pluralism in thought, and yet conformity in deed.
That we PRACTICE Halachah as Beth Hillel, but in the area of learning and thought Beth Shammai is equally "Divrei Elokim Hayyim"
For an illustration of this kind of opposition combined with deference, see the Aruch HaShulchan on the matter of al Neqiyut Yadayim.
KT
RRW
1 comment:
It sounds, however, that Rabbi Wolpoe's distinction is actually the basis of the law regarding a zaken mamreh who in only punishable if he actually acts according to his psak, not if he teaches according to this view. If this is so, what is the difference then between his viewpoint l'dorot and the specific rule regarding the zaken mamreh in regard to the Sanhedrin? My leaning is, as such, that there would seem to be greater allowance for difference even in actual behaviour within our present world situation.
Of course, I can think of two arguments already that could be made to challenge my assertion. One is that the rule of the zaken mamreh could still be seen as a model even without the strict technical requirements of a Sanhedrin to enforce a death penalty. Even without a Sanhedrin, it could be argued that, for similar reasons, there should be uniformity. See, however, the view of the Minchat Chinuch that contends that there is a great distinction in rules of this nature when dialogue between the opposing viewpoints, majority and minority, is not fully possible. A Sanhedrin inherently allows for this and that is why there is the strong position against a daat yachid.
It could also be contended, on the other hand, that, viewing the language of the Rambam, it is not so simple that a zaken mamreh can even teach his view. He clearly does not face the death penalty if he only teaches but whether he should do so or not in the first place is not so simple. If this is true, though, there would still exist a distinction between the world of the Sanhedrin and the present and my challenge to Rabbi Wolpoe that his view is too much like the law of zaken mamreh falls off. In our world there clearly is no limitation of teaching. My views still remain that there is today more leniency for disagreement in practice and this is as it should be b'zmananeinu.
Rabbi Ben Hecht
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