This post continues the weekly series on the Nishmablog that features responses on JVO by one of our two Nishma Scholars who are on this panel. This week's presentation is to one of the questions to which Rabbi Hecht responded.
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Question: If New York state is not forcing Jewish institutions to perform same-sex marriages, why are Jewish groups still against the gay marriage bill?
At the base of this question would seem to be an
assumption that if Jewish individuals, groups or institutions are not
imposed upon by a law, it is not their place, or there is no reason for
them, to oppose this law. In terms of this specific case, it would seem
that the one asking this question is assuming that since the New York
state gay marriage bill will not cause any Jew to act contrary to
his/her religious principles, there is no reason for Jews to oppose this
law. Thus the question why a Jew would fight against this law. Is this
assumption, however, correct? That is the real issue within this
question.
Before commenting on this, we should, perhaps, first
clearly outline Orthodox Judaism’s view of same-sex marriages. As is
generally recognized, homosexual behaviour*
is understood by Orthodoxy to be clearly prohibited by Torah law, both
for Jews and for Non-Jews under the Seven Laws of Noah (the Noahide
Code) which is deemed to be binding on all humanity. (In regard to this
Code in general, see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim chapters 9 and 10; in regard to the specific prohibition regarding homosexual behaviour, see Halacha 9:5.)
What many do not know, though, is that the institution of same-sex
marriage is actually looked upon, within the literature, as an even
lower form of immorality. See, for example, Rashi, Chullin 92b. See, also, Sifra, Acharei Mot 132 which includes same-sex marriages as practices of the Egyptian and Canaanite societies, deemed to be, by Sifra, Acharei Mot 131 and other sources, the most immoral
of all societies. It is thus clear within the Torah literature that the
practice of same-sex marriage is highly problematic.
Notwithstanding this moral position, is it still
proper for Jews to attempt to impose this value – a value emerging from
their religious perspective – on the general American society? There are
two parts to this question. One is from the perspective of Judaism:
should Jews care, halachically,
about the moral practices of Non-Jews if such practices have no bearing
on Jewish individuals or Jewish society? Presenting an argument that
Jews do not proselytise, many people may answer with a simple ‘no’. The
answer really is not so simple. While Jews may be restrained in
promoting Non-Jews to convert to become Jews, Jewish thought may have a
different understanding of the attitude Jews should have in regard to
promoting the observance of the Noahide Code amongst Gentiles. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 8:10 seems to clearly outline an obligation upon Jews to promote observance of the Noahide Code amongst Non-Jews. Rabbi
Michael Broyde, The Orthodox Forum: Tikkun Olam, The Obligation of Jews
to Seek Observances of Noahide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review,
however, maintains that Maimonides’ view actually represents a minority
position and that the majority of scholars do not perceive an
obligation. This, however, does not mean that there is still no
religious value in promoting observance of the Noahide Laws amongst
Gentiles. One of the important defining characteristics of our
forefather Avraham was that he did spread the knowledge of God and the
observance of His ways throughout his world. See, for example, Rashi, Bereishit 12:5.
It would thus seem proper for Jews to, at least, be concerned about the
moral values of the general world and, to some extent, promote values
of a universal nature found within the Torah.
There is, however, a second part to this question
and that concerns the promotion of Torah values within America which
prides itself on the value of freedom of religion, a value that has also
served the Jewish community well. There are again two parts to this
sub-question, one - the theoretical, the other - the practical. These
are both most complex issues and even a preliminary investigation of
these matters would be too extensive for this forum. Yet, if we consider
the original question, the demand was not to decide whether Jews should
be actively against the same-sex legislation or not, but rather to
explain why would various Jewish institutions continue to be against it
when Jews will not be forced to violate their principles thereby. This
question can be answered more concisely. The above sources clearly show
that there is a strong view within Jewish thought that Jews are to be
concerned about the moral behaviour of Gentiles as defined by the
Noahide Code. As such, it should not be surprising to find Jews who
would challenge a law clearly contrary to this Code.
The problem, though, is the practical side of this
issue. Is it not dangerous to the furtherance of Jewish life in this
society to attempt to impose our values on the society for could this
not lead to another group attempting to impose their values on society
at our expense? If we attempt to stop gays from marrying because of our
values, even though it would seem that such behaviour does not actually
directly affect us in any way, what argument could we have against
individuals attempting, because of their values, to prevent the
circumcision of children, terming it ‘male genital mutilation’, even
though it does not personally affect them? The very idea of freedom of
religion is the allowance to let others follow their value constructs
(within certain parameters) – and such a standard has served the Jewish
community well. It is actually well known that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein
maintained that protecting the Jewish community’s ability to practice
Torah in an unhindered manner is more important than siding with a
position that may be more in line with our universal ethical standards
yet may also possibly hinder this ability. It is for this reason that
Rabbi Feinstein instructed Jewish institutions to side with the
Pro-Choice camp in the abortion debate because this position will enable
Jews to make any such decision with a consideration solely of the halachic criteria while the Pro-Life position may impose other value determinants, contrary to the Halacha.
(I am sorry, while this decision is well known and I have heard it
stated numerous times, I do not have a non-oral source for it.) So is
there not a practical concern with challenging this law given its
present parameters?
Those who continue to oppose this law, however,
believe that this is precisely the point. Who is to say that the present
limitations on the extent of this law will continue into the future?
There is a concern that as a moral standard in opposition to Torah
strengthens, there is a possibility that these new standards could lead
to an eventual direct imposition on Torah standards. When one hears gay
activists comparing religious opponents to same-sex marriage to Southern
Baptists in the first half of the eighteenth century who opposed the
abolition of slavery, this concern would seem to be very real. There is
also another concern that the advancement of these values could change
the societal milieu, creating subtle and indirect yet problematic
circumstances for observant Jews. As such, it is difficult to fully
maintain that the advancement of the values in support of same-sex
marriage could not eventually be harmful to the lifestyle of Torah
committed individuals and their families.
Opponents of same-sex marriage also contend that
they are careful to frame their arguments within the context of general
moral structures and not Torah per se. In this regard, they maintain
that, while they are promoting their religious values, they are, as
citizens, simply entering into a general discussion that concerns
society as a whole. The issue of when such arguments cross the line of
challenging freedom of religion and when they are simply part of the
general discussion of a society’s mores is hard to define. Nonetheless,
it can be expected that one voicing an opinion in the context of
society’s standards will be affected by his/her background and
tradition, and the call to discount this reality is simply unrealistic.
My objective in this answer is not to express my view on the issue but
simply to offer a possible Torah reason for continuing to oppose
same-sex marriage. They maintain that, if done in a proper fashion,
their opposition is an expression of their Jewish values and in the
protection of their rights while simultaneously not challenging their
parallel commitment to America’s standard of freedom of religion.
*
It should be noted that, technically, one could contend that this
statement actually only applies to male homosexual behaviour and that my
ensuing arguments are not, as such, applicable to lesbianism. To be
honest, there is some basis to this argument yet there is also no doubt
that lesbianism is clearly looked upon negatively by the Torah as well.
See, for example, Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 20:2. The technical discussion of the distinction in Halacha
between male and female homosexuality is, however, an extensive topic
in itself and beyond the specific parameters of this issue. As such, we
will not elaborate upon it. It is sufficient for our purposes to
outline, from these sources, the general attitude to homosexuality and
same-sex marriage within Orthodoxy, so that we may respond to a question
that touches upon how we are to maintain our ethical viewpoint on this
subject in a world in which the general attitude is changing.
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